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Volume XIII
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Number 4

THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1947
STATISTICAL SURVEY
MURRY LEE RANDALL*

This survey is based on the opinions handed down by the supreme court
during the year 1947. Of the 244 majority opinions dealt with by this survey, four represent two separate cases each, and one represents three cases,
making a total of 255 cases disposed of in 1947. Ten other cases were decided
by division in 1947 and were later decided en banc during 1948, and a rehearing was granted in division for one case which was then re-argued and
decided in 1948. Since opinions were not released until the 1948 decisions,
those opinions are not considered in this survey. Seven of the opinions were
originally written as divisional opinions and later adopted as the opinions of
the court en banc. Seven dissenting opinions and seven separate coricurring
opinions were handed down. There was one supplemental per curiam opinion
and six per curiam opinions denying motions. As was expected, due to the
fact that much litigation was held up during the war, the total for the year
shows a considerable increase over the number of opinions handed down during the war years.'
TABLE I
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY EACH DIVISION'

En Banc-------------------------------------------------------42
Division N umber One ...............................................
109
Division Number Two ----------------------------------------------93

T otal ........................................................
244
Table II is a classification of the opinions handed down during -1947 according to the dominant issue involved. Many of the cases involved more
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. Totals for the preceding five years are as follows: 1942, 293; 1943, 306;
1944, 251; 1945, 197; 1946, 181.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law (345)
Scholarship Repository, 1948
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than one important issue, and in some cases a dominant issue was necessarily
more or less arbitrarily selected.
TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS.

Administrative Law and Procedure .............................................
Adoption ............................................................................................
Appeal and Error..............................................................................
Brokers ..............................................................................................
Com m erce ............................................................................................
Constitutional L aw ..........................................................................

2
2
9
3
1
8

Contempt

1

..............................

Contracts .........................................................................................
8
Corporations .....................................................................................
2
Counties .............................................................................................
1
Courts .................................................................................................
9
C rim inal Law ................................................................................
37
D am ages ...............................................
:.................................
1
D isbarrm ent ........................................................................................
1
D ivorce ................................................................................................
4
Elections ............................................................................................
1
Em inent D om ain ..............................................................................
3
E quity ................................................................................................
1
Evidence .....................................................
8
G arnishm ent .....................................................................................
1

G ifts ....................................................................................................

1

H abeas Corpus ....................................................................................
1
Husband and Wife (other than divorce) ......................................
3
Injunction ..........................................................................................
4
Insurance .....................................................
6
Judges ....................................................................................................
1

Judgm ents ..........................................................................................
4
Landlord and Tenant ...........................................................................
1
Licenses .................................................
4
Lim itations of A ctions .................................................................
2
M andam us .......................................................................................
2
M aster and Servant ......................................................................
8
M onopolies ..........................................................................................
1
M ortgages ............................................................................................
M unicipal Corporations .................................................................
N egligence (autom obile) ..................................................................
Other Negligence ...........................................................................
Officers ..................................................................................................
Pleading .............................................................................................
Practice and Procedure ..............................
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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Prohibition -----------------------------------------------------2
R eal Property ....................................................................................
12
Schools and School Districts .............................----------------------------4
Specific Performance ----------------------------------------------5
Statutes ........................................................
2
Taxation ------------------------------------------------------11
Tort (other than negligence) ---------------------------------------4
Trusts ---------------------------------------------------------- 6
Unemployment Compensation --------------------------------------2
Unfair Competition ..........----------------------------------------.--------------------1
Wills and Administration ....................................................................
10
Workmen's Compensation ...................................------------------------- 5
Total --------------------------------...................-----------------------------------------

244

Table III indicates the disposition of the cases handled by the 244 opinions handed down during 1947. The phrases, so far as is practical for this
purpose, are those used by the judges and commissioners in the opinions.
TABLE III
DIsPosITIoN OF LrimGATION

Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Preemptory ........................
2
Alternative Writ of Mandamus made Permanent ----------------------1
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Quashed ........................................
1
Appeal Dismissed -----------------------------------------------1
Both Appeals Dismissed -------------------------------------------1
Cause Transferred to Court of Appeals --------------------------------9
Cause Remanded for Correction of Award and Otherwise
Affirmed ----------------------------------------------------1
Decree affirmed --------------------------------------------------3
Decree Affirmed in Part and Cause Remanded with Directions .... 1
D ecree Reversed ..................................................................................
1
Exceptions Overruled and Plan of Reorganization Approved ------ 1
Fine Imposed on Respondents for Contempt ----------------------------1
Judgment Affirmed ---------------------------------.........---------------------------------128
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded for Further
Proceedings ---------------------------------------------------1
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 1
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part ........................
3
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and
Cause Rem anded ............................................................................
2
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Corrected and Affirmed as
Corrected in Part -------------------------------.........-------1
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
Remanded with Directions ----------------..............----------------------------1
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
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Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur ........................
1
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur; otherwise
Reversed and Cause Remanded ................................
1
Judgment and Decree Affirmed ..................................
3
Judgment Reversed ...........................................
8
Judgment Reversed, and Cause Remanded ............................
27
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........
16
Judgment Reversed and Defendant Discharged .........................
2
Judgment of Circuit Court Reversed and Award Affirmed ........
1
fudgment of Circuit Court Reversed ...............................
3
Judgment Reversed and Rights of Parties Declared ....................
1
Judgment of Ouster Awarded ..................................
1
Motion to Dismiss Appeal Overruled and Judgment Affirmed ......
1
Opinion of Court of Appeals Quashed; Judgment of Trial

Court Affirmed ................................................
. 2

Order Affirm ed ...............................................
1
Order Granting a New Trial Affirmed and Cause Remanded ......
1
Order Granting a New Trial As to Liability Only
. Affirmed, and Cause Remanded ................................
1
Order Granting a New Trial Reversed with Directions to

Reinstate Verdict .........................................
*.............................
1

Order Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ................
1
Preemptory Writ of Mandamus Granted _-.-........... 1....
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition made Permanent ......................
1
Preliminary Rule Made Absolute ................................
1
Preliminary Rule in Prohibition made Absolute as to One
Defendant, and Discharged as to Other Defendants ................
1
Provisional Rule in Prohibition made Absolute .......................
1
Records of Circuit Court Quashed ................................
1
Respondent Disbarred .........................................
1
Respondent's Record Quashed. ....................................
1
Rule Absolute in Prohibition Issued, and Alleged
Comtemptors Discharged .....................................
1
Rule Made Absolute in Part, Otherwise Discharged ...................
1
Submission Set Aside as Premature and Cause Returned to
General Docket ............................................
1
Writ of Mandamus Quashed ...................................
n.......................
1

Total .................................................
244
Table IV shows, as far as records are now available, the disposition of
motions subsequent to the final decision of the Supreme Court. Cases in
which rehearings were granted or which were transferred to the court en bane
are not within that category.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DECISION.
for Rehearing Denied ........................................................
101
to Transfer to Court en Banc Denied ................................ 26
to Modify Denied
"
1
to Remand for Partial New Trial Denied- ....................
1

T otal ............................................................................................

129

APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V.

GARNETT*

THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

A total of eight cases which were transferred to the courts of appeal is
revealed in the opinions written by the supreme court during the year under
Yeview. These decisions demonstrate the fact that, while the constitutional
.definition separating the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court and the
courts of appeal' is comparatively simple, the application of the principles
involved in that definition to complicated statements of fact is not always
easy.
Appellate review of constitutional questions is lodged in- the supreme
court, but in State ex rel Heppe v. Zilafro,2 where it was contended that a writ
of mandamus to compel school district directors to submit a consolidation
proposal under the procedure provided for by oneosection of the statutes and
not under the procedure provided for by a later section, it was held that the
claim that the calling of a special election under the first section would be
violative of the due process clause of the constitution was only a colorable
claim of the existence of a constitutional question, the real point at issue involving only a construction of the statute. The court further points out that
a litigant may not lodge review proceedings in the supreme court by anticipating an adverse judgment and inserting appropriate 2verments in the
pleadings that the same would violate the due process or the constitutional
provisions; and the court also again announced that a school district is not a
political ubdivision of the state within the meaning of the constitutional
provision on appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly the case was transferred to
the court of appeals.
*

Attorney, Kansas City, LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912,

1. MO. CONST. ART v,§ 3 (1945).

2. 206 S.W. 2d 496 (Mo. 1947).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
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In St. Ferdinand Sewer District v. Turner where the action was one
brought by the sewer district to recover certain delinquent sewer taxes the
court reviewed the provisions of earlier constitutions upon the subject of appellate jurisdiction, pointed to the fact that the Constitution of 1945 was
regarded in the constitutional convention as one making no substantial change
in appellate jurisdiction and again held that a proceeding to collect sewer
taxes does not involve construction of the revenue laws of the state in a constitutional sense, and the fact that the sewer district is a public corporation
does not confer appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court, pointing to earlier
'decisions holding that such districts are not political subdivisions of the state
within the meaning of the provisions of earlier constitutions. Accordingly
the appeal was transferred to the court of appeals.
4
because the
The court transferred the case of McGuire v. Hutchisona
value, in money, of the relief sought. was not affirmatively shown by the record, the proceeding being one involving the ownership and right of control
over certain patents covered by a trust agreement. But, in City of St. Louis
v. Essex Investment Company5 the court retained appellate jurisdiction of a
proceeding where several appellants were seeking to recover condemnation
awards no one of which satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of a minimum
of $7500.00, but which, in the aggregate, involved more than the jurisdictional
amount. The court announced that the question was not free from difficulty
but retained jurisdiction in reliance upon rules announced in class actions,
citing its earlier decisions in Aufderkeide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Company
and Rombauer v. Compton Heights Christian Churcl.7 The court did not
consider what effect a dismissal of the appeals of one or more claimants, but
less than all, thereby reducing the aggregate amount below the jurisdictional
amount, would have had on its appellate jurisdiction.
In First National Bank v. Schaake, B a proceeding in equity brought by
the executors and trustees under a will for the purpose of having the court
make an election as to whether it would be for the best interest of testator's
insane widow to renounce the provision of his will or take one half of his estate, the record did not affirmatively show the amount involved, and the court
held that lthough title to real estate was collaterally involved the judgment
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

203 S.W. 2d 731 (Mo. 1947).
201 S.W. 2d 322 (Mo. 1947).
204 S.W. 2d ,726 (Mo. 1947).
319 Mo. 337, 4 S.W. 2d 776 (Mo. 1928).
328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W. 2d 545 (Mo. 1931).
200 S.W. 2d 326 (Mo. 1947).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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sought would not directly operate to take title from one and give it to another; hence title to real estate was not involved in the jurisdictional sense.
The cause was transferred to the court of appeals. Similarly, the court transferred the case of Hanna v. Slheetz,9 which was a statutory will contest proceeding, because the record did not affirmatively show the jurisdictional
amount nor whether or not any real estate passed by the will. The court also
transferred Smith v. Santarelli,'0 a case involving an easement over real estate, because an easement strictly speaking does not carry any title to the
land, but only to a right to subject it to a particular use; and also transferred
Blake v. Shower," a case involving only leasehold rights, and Murawski v.
MurawskZ' 2 a proceeding in partition between a divorced husband and wife,
again reaffirming earlier decisions holding that the inchoate right of dower does
not constitute real estate in the jurisdictional sense.
QUESTIONS FOR

REVIEW

In the case of Oganaso v. Mellow, 1 3 the appeal was from an order sustaining plaintiff's motion for a new trial, after a verdict for defendant. Upon
appellate review defendants contended that the trial court had erred in overruling their motion for directed verdict. That motion was in general terms
only and failed to make known to the court the grounds therefor as required
by Section 122 of the Code.- Notwithstanding the insufficiency of the motion,
the court held that defendant's contention that plaintiff failed to make out a
case for the jury was a meritorious one and, in accordance with the provisions
of Supreme Court Rule 3.27, considered the question thereby presented. This
decision again illustrates the modernizing effect of the code adopted in 1943
upon the practice in Missouri.
A different situation was before the court in the case of In re Duren,' where the decision introduces a new principle in appellate practice which, if
followed, will be of far reaching importance. That case reached the court by
transfer from the Kansas City Court" of Appeals where a judgment sustaining
a petition for adoption had been reversed by that court.' 6 The appeal was
taken by the guardian ad litem who had been appointed to represent the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

200 S.W. 2d 338 (Mo. 1947).
199 S.W. 2d 411 (Mo. 1947).
202 S.W. 2d 895 (Mo. 1947).
203 S.W. 2d 714 (Mo. 1947).
201 S.W. 2d 365 (Mo. 1947).
Mo. LAws 1943, p. 389; Mo. REv.
200 S.W. 2d 343 (Mo. 1947).
195 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. 1946).

STAT.

ANN.'§ 847.122 (Supp. 1947).
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interests of the child in the adoption proceeding. No point had been made,
either in the'trial court or in the court of appeals that the written consent of
such a guardian was a condition precedent to a valid adoption. The court
of appeals, without that point having been raised by either party in the litigation, of its own motion undertook to consider the effect of the failure of the
guardian to consent to the proceeding and reversed the judgment below upon
the ground that such consent was necessary and the lack of consent rendered
the adoption void. It will thus be seen that the court of appeals decided the
case upon an issue not presented either in the trial court or in the court of
appeals. Obviously, therefore, the court of appeals decided the case without
the benefit of argument pro and con upon the single issue on which the
decision Was based.
When the case iached the supreme court by transfer appellant stood on
the original brief filed in the court of appeals which did not raise the consent
issue. Respondent, however, filed a new brief in the supreme court challenging
the correctness of the decision of the court of appeals upon the consent issue
and renewing the argument it had made in the motion for rehearing filed,
without avail, in the court of appeals. The supreme court answered in the
affirmative the two questions of whether or not (a) the court of appeals had
the power to decide an issue not raised in that court; and (b) whethier or not
the supreme court had the power to decide an issue not raised by appellant
in that court.
In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court did not consider the question of whether or not such an appellate review satisfies the requirements of
due process of law. The court reviews at some length Rules 1.08, 1.15, 1.28,
and 3.27 of the Supreme Court Rules governing appellate review, and Sections.
114, 123, 139 and 140 of the 1943 Code of Civil Procedure. Emphasis is placed
by the court upon Rule 3:27 which provides that "Plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered. .. " either on motion for new trial or on appeal, although not raised or preserved for review, when the prevention of manifest injustice requires it. The opinion states:
"We believe the Court of Appeals had the right under that
-Rule to introduce the 'consent' issue into the case. It was a legal
capsheaf based on the court's conclusions of law and fact with respect to the issues actually litigated below. We think we may consider that same issue now, since we have been substituted for the
Court of Appeals as the appellate court) and especially when it is remembered that respondents"'brief here riises the issue negatively.
While Sec. 140 (a) of the Code, supra, doubtless was enacted in part
I

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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to shield appellate litigants from surprise, and to protect them from
i disposition of the cause on issues not raised below when the litiga-"
tion was in a formative stage, still it does permit that in the instances
specified above, and the disappointed party may always file a motion
for rehearing, as respondents did in this case. We are not attempting
to say how broadly Rule 3.27 operates; but only that we think it is
applicable here."
When an appellate court undertakes to decide a question upon which
it has not heard argument it as effectively denies due process of law as if it
has refused to hear any arguments upon the case at all. "He that answereth a
matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him."'1 7 In the opinion
under review it would seem that the court of appeals violated fundamental
principles of due process when it undertook to decide the case on the so-called
consent issue-an issue upon which neither of the parties had been heard.
The supreme court's opinion points to the fact that the losing party on that
issue had the opportunity, and exercised it, of presenting his views by motion
for rehearing; but it is always true that, when a judicial decision has been
reached, the task of overturning it by motion for rehearing is herculean indeed. It would also seem that the question is not one falling within the meaning of the term "plain errors." That the so-called error was not so plain is
demonstrated by the fact that the court of appeals reached one conclusion
and the supreme court reached the opposite conclusion. No matter how
broad Rule 3.27 may be construed to be, there still remains the question of
whether or not due process is accorded when an appellate court. undertakes,
of its own motion, to base its decision upon an issue not presented by the parties and not made the subject of adversary argument. The better practice,
would seem to be, when such a question presents itself, for the reviewing court
to order the parties to appear again before it and present their views upon
the issue so discovered by the court before the court undertakes to decide
that issue. A decision made after argument is more likely to be sound than
ont made without the benefit of argument. That is strikingly demonstrated in
the reported case, where the court of appeals decided the issue without argument and the supreme court decided the same question the other way after
having considered the argument presented by the opinion of the court of
appeals and answered by the respondent's motion for rehearing and brief.
17 Proverbs, Chap 18, Ver. 13, quoted in Ex Parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63, 157 S.W.
794, 808 (Mo. 1913).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948
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THE RIGHT OF APPEAL

By Section 125 of the Code of Civil Procedure' writs of error were abolished; and in State ex rel McPike v. Hughes'9 the court, in an opinion carefully considering the prior state of the law and the effect of the Constitution
of 1945 upon the question, held the statute to be constitutional and that the
appellate courts have no jurisdiction to issue writs of error.
In Woods v. Cantrell'0 the trial court undertook to enter an order overruling the motion for new trial more than 90 days after that motion had been
filed, and the court held that an appeal taken within ten day after that order
but fifteen days after the ninety day period had expired was ineffectual, and
the appeal was dismissed. Also, in Wormington v. City of Monett 2" the
appeal was dismissed because plaintiff died pending appeal from a judgment
in his favor and no substitution of parties was made within one year.
In State ex rel Thompson v. Terte22 the court held that while a judgment of dismissal is ordinarily a final judgment and therefore appealable, a
judgment of dismissal as to a part only of the defendants but not as to all
does not dispose of the action and an appeal from such a judgment of dismissal is premature. The court also holds that the filing of a notice of such an
appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and that
such jurisdiction is retained until the appeal has been perfected by the filing
of a transcript in the appellate court.
RECORDS AND BRIEFS

In Leaman v. Campbell 66 Express Truck Line23 the court followed recent decisions and practice holding that where there were reasonable grounds
for the delay the failure to lodge the transcript of the record within six months
from the time the appeal is taken is not fatal, and that the appellate court has
the power to enlarge or extend the time even after that time has expired.
It was made to appear that the delay was occasioned by excusable neglect
and that the appeal was meritorious. Again, in Whealen v. St. Louis Soft
Ball Association,24 which reached the supreme court by transfer from the
court of appeals, the original transcript filed in the appellate court did not include the judgment appealed from but the court of appeals had ordered the
18. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 847.125 (Supp. 1947).
19. 199 S.W. 2d 405 (Mo. 1947).
20. 201 S.W. 2d 311 (Mo. 1947).
21, 204 S.W. 2d 264 (Mo. 1947).
22. 207 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1947).

23. 199 S.W. 2d 359 (Mo. 1947).
24. 202 S.W. 2d 891 (Mo. 1947).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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circuit clerk to send up the judgment so that it could be made a part of the
record. That action by' he court of appeals was held to be within its discretion
and justified; but the opinion admonishes the Bar that the views expressed
are not an invitation "to careless practice." The same procedure was followed
25
by the supreme court in Feigenbaum v. Van Raalt.
In Baldwin v. Desgranges,26 another case involving the late filing of the
transcript, the court points to the provisions of Section 2 of the code that it
was enacted to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action T and ruled: "Only in exceptional circumstances could an action be
justly disposed of by dismissing a meritorious appeal. The spirit of the new
civil code undoubtedly is to dispose of appealed causes on their merits unless
delinquency in the procedural steps to appeal have been too grave to condone,
and.., the new rules of this court bespeak the same liberal spirit as to disposition of appealed causes on their merits..."
The same leniency is shown in the opinions now under review in cases
where appellants have failed to comply with the rules of court in preparing
their briefs. In Brune v. Rathbun2 appellant, in violation of court rules, devoted thirty pages of his brief to a copy of the pleadings, agreed statement of
facts, judgment of the court and other matters which duly appeared in the
transcript. The court denied a motion to dismiss because of that infraction
of its rules, stating, "We treat this portion of appellants brief as surplusage..." Similarly, in Holmes v. McNei 2 appellant's brief failed to set out essential facts in the statement, but the court, although observing that the
statement was "not free from fault," pointed to the fact that the record was
short and that the inconvenience occasioned was not such as to call for a dismissal of the appeal, commenting that the new rules are "as liberal for reachin'g the merits."
fn no opinion written during the year under review has there been a
dismissal of appeal or other refusal to consider the merits upon technical
grounds. The decisions of the court carry out, to a marked degree, the spirit
of reform in matters of practice in Missouri as crystalized by the adoption of
its new code of civil procedure, its new constitution, and the rules of court
adopted in conformity therewith.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

201 S.W. 2d 283 (Mo. 1947).
199 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. 1947).
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.2 (Supp. 1947).
204 S.W. 2d 705 (Mo. 1947).
204 S.W. 2d 303 (Mo. 1947).
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CRIMINAL LAW
B. LANG, JR.*

HOWARD

Substantive and procedural questions in the field of criminal law involve
matters which generally speaking have been passed upon by the courts on
numerous occasions and, therefore; in most instances the law has been fairly
well settled. There were, however, during the year 1947 two cases of first
impression before the Supreme Court of Missouri.,
I.

PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL

A.

Arrest

The right of an officer to use force in effecting arrest and the question ofthe amount of force which can be used has always been a perplexing question.
In the case of State v. Browers2 the defendant was charged with felonious.
assault on an officer and the question involved was whether or not the officer
was making a lawful arrest of defendant's brother. If the arrest was unlawful
the defendant had a! right to aid his brother. The majority opinion held
that no felony had been committed and that if anything at ll took place a
misdemeanor had been committed outside the presence of the officer and
that, therefore, the question of whether or not the arrest was legal was one,
on which .the court should have instructed the jury, and should have further
instructed that jf the arrest was illegal. that the defendant bad a right to use
such force as.reasonably necessary to repel the assault on defendant's brother.
The principal. opinion of the court concluded that an officer has no right to
shoot in making an arrest for a misdemeanor, even though the accused is.
trying to escape.
In a concurring opinion the writer reasoned that the marshal in attempting to make the arrest of the defendant's brother was doing so either for sideswiping an automobile without stopping at the scene, a felony, or for a'breach
of the peace, which involved a quarrel on a public street which the marshal
witnessed himself, and that, therefore, the arrest itself was lawful and in
either instance, under the provisions of our statutes, after thq arrest had been
made if the .defendant flee or forcibly resist, then the officer could use all
*Prosecuting Attorney, Boone County, Columbia, A.B., University of Missouri,
1934, LL.B. 1936, M.A. 1937.
1. State v. Wynne, 356 Mo. 1095, 204 S.W. 2d 927 (1947). In this case the
court had before it the question of forfeiture of bond where extradition had been refused . State v. Baker, 355 Mo. 1048,199. S.W. 2d 393 (1947). The court here had
for consideration the question of escape "under guard."
2. 356 Mo. 1195, 205 S.W. 2d 721 (1947).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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necessary means to effect the arrest. The concurring judge agreed with the
result of the majority opinion because he reasoned that the marshal had used
more force than reasonably necessary to maintain the arrest after it had
once been made, pointing out that the marshal had made no attempt to apprehend the fugitive by pursuit or other means, but had begun firing as soon
as the fugitive broke away from him. The majority opinion ruled that there
was no right to use deadly force under the circumstances there presented,
and the concurring opinion stated that there was a right to use deadly force
if other means had been first exhausted.
In the case of State v.Parker4 the rights of a person in his individual
capacity as a member of a posse, and the rights of an officer ih using deadly
force in effecting an arrest are fully discussed. In this case the defendant's
conviction of murder in the second degree was affirmed, overruling the defendant's contention that he was justified as a matter of law in using the force
to effect the arrest. The evidence was held by the court sufficient to indicate
that the defendant in firing on the deceased was actuated by malice rather
than by using force reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest, and that
the jury was entitled, under the instructions of the court, to determine this
fact.
B. Indictment and information
The court on several occasions reaffirmed the long accepted ruling that
an information in the language of the statute is sufficient.5
The Missouri courts have long accepted the rule that a conviction for
a lesser included offense may be had on an information or indictment charging the greater offense. In one case- the defendant was convicted of larceny
from a person under an information charging robbery.6 A conviction of burglary alone on a charge of burglary and larceny.was sustained7 and in another
case, in accordance with the statute, a conviction for embezzlement under a
8
larceny information was ruled proper.
An information charging murder in the first degree in which it was charged that the defendant "in some way and manner and by some means, instru3. See Mo. REv.. STAT. § 3960 (1939).
4. 355 Mo. 916, 199 S.W. 2d 338 (1947).
5. State v. Gorden, 356 Mo. 1010, 204 S.W. 2d 713 (1947); State v. Florian,
355 Mo. 1169, 200 S.W. 2d 64 (1947); State v. Clemons, 356 Mo. 514, 202 S.W. 2d
75 (1947).
6. State v. Gardner, 356 Mo. 1015, 204 S.W. 2d 716 (1947).
7. State v. Higdon, 356 Mo. 1058, 204 S.W. 2d 754 (1947).
8. State v. Ward, 356 Mo. 499, 202 S.W. 2d 46 (1947), noted 13'Mo. L. REv.
106 (1947).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1948], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

ments and weapons to this informant unknown . . ." without setting forth
the exact method of causing death, was sustained. The court ruled that the
state did not need to set out the weapon used by the defendant in making
the assault, holding that under our statutes every killing which is wilful, deliberate and premeditated is murder in the first degree and that the information need not charge the manner in which the deceased was killed.,
The substitution of an information correctly charging the defendant
under the habitual criminal act is proper and the defendant is not entitled
to a preliminary hearing ,ecause no new offense is charged.10 The court in
like manner ruled that an amendment of an information as to form and not
substance is proper and does not entitle the defendant to a preliminary
hearing.'
The court had before it the sufficiency of an information under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 4409 (1939), which is one of the three
sections involving an offense of assault. Section 4409 does not require that
the assault be made with malice aforethought. The information alleged that
the assault was made with malice aforethought and upon conviction the
defendant complained of the information and the instruction thereunder
because the words "with malice aforethooght" were inserted therein. The,
court in overruling the contention ruled that the appellant was helped instead
of harmed thereby because the conviction was made more difficult and the
unnecessary allegation did not void the' information. 12
C. Continuances
In one case the court had before it the question of the time of trial where
one of the attorneys for the defendant was a member of the legislature."
The court held that since the legislature had recessed for thirty days and the
motion for new trial was argued and submitted more than ten days after
ihe beginning of the recess the defendant was not entitled to a continuance.
In the same case an issue was raised because of the fact that the defendant's
trial was held before the term to which the justice transcript was returnable.
The court made the statement "Criminal cases are not returnable to parti9. State v. Courtney, 356 Mo. 531, 202 S.W. 2d 72, I.c. 73 (1947).
10. State v. Miller, 202 S.W. 2d 887 (Mo. 1947).
11. State v. Sapp, 356 Mo. 705, 203 S.W. 2d 425 (1947).
12. State v. Null, 355 Mo. 1034, 199 S.W. 2d 639 (1947).
13. State v. Bryant, 356 Mo. 1223, 205 S. W. 2d 732, I.c. 734 (1947). See also
State v. Courtney, 356 Mo. 531, 202 S.W. 2d 72 (1947), refusing a continuance
where information was substituted for an indictment and simply corrected the form
thereof.
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cular terms of court, as civil cases were under our former code, so there can
be nothing in that portion of defendant's assignment."
D. Bail
An interesting and unique question was presented to the court in the
case of State v. Wynne 4 which involved an appeal from an order forfeiting
a reconnaissance on an appeal bond from a second degree murder conviction.
The defendant failed to appear for a rehearing on the case and an interlocutory judgment forfeiting the reconnaissance and ordering a writ of scire
facias served on the sureties was entered. The defendant was located in the
State of Louisiana and the Governor of Louisiana refused to grant extradition
upon application of the Governor of the State of Missouri. The trial court
had ruled that it had no discretion in remission of the penalty imposed. On
the appeal the sureties took the position that they were unable to procure
the presence of Mrs. Wynne by an act of law in that the federal state officials
in Louisiana refused to aid in the return. This contention was overruled by
the court which ruled that a surety cannot take advantage of an act of law
preventing the return of the fugitive unless the law be one operative in the
state where the obligation was assumed, which of course here would be the
State of Missouri.
The court reversed the case because the trial court took the position
that it had no discretion on the question of the forfeiture of the bond. There
was no question of an abuse of discretion. In this case of first impression the
majority opinion of the court ruled that the trial court was in error in refusing
to recognize that it had a discretion under the statute of this state on the forfeiture of bond, the last clause of which provides in part "...unless remitted
by the court for cause shown." 15
This case was considered of such importance by the court that there was
a concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion. 'The well reasoned dissent
takes the position that a bondsman should only be discharged if he is prevented by an act of God, act of law, an act of the obligee or by act of the
public enemy from fulfilling the obligation of the bond, and that none of these
grounds were present in this case. The dissenting opinion points out that the
voluntary act of the principal in leaving-the state and refusing to return was
the basis for forfeiture of the bond, and that even under these facts, which

14. 356 Mo. 1095, 204 S.W. 2d 927 (1947).
15. See Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 3973 (1939).
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were admitted to be true by the sureties, the trial court could not have ruled
otherwise than it did.
E. Right to counsel

In State v. Weston 16 the court ruled that the defendant was not reprived
of due process of law simply because he went to trial without counsel. The
record showed that the defendant originally had employed counsel who was
permitted to withdraw from the case; that thereafter, on November 1, the
defendant appeared in court without counsel. He was informed by the court
that he was able-bodied and could get some money to employ counsel. On
December 6, the defendant appeared again in court and stated that he had
funds to employ counsel and that he would do so. The case was set for trial
for the following January 18, at which time both the State and defendant
announced ready for trial, although the defendant appeared again without
counsel. The court held under these circumstances that the defendant was
hot entitled to the appointment of counsel and that he was not deprived
of due process by failure of the court to designate an attorney to represent
him.
II. TRIAL
A. Panel and jury

In one case an objection was made to the failure to include women in the
panel summoned for the trial of the case. The court summarily disposed of
this question by stating that there was no showing in the record of any systematic exclusion or attempt to exclude women from the panel.'7
In another case the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to discharge the jury where a spectator in a manslaughter case involving the operation of an automobile spoke out during the trial
and stated that his daughter was also killed at the same time. 18
During the course of trial the sheriff and his chief deputy testified as
witnesses for the State as to a confession made by the defendant. Objection
was thereafter made by the defendant as to the sheriff or the chief deputy
having custody of the jury. The court immediately swore in two other deputies to take charge of the jury and from then on neither the sheriff nor his
chief deputy had any contact with the jury whatsoever. The defendant contended that the case should be remanded because of the prior contact between
16.-202 S.W. 2d 50 (Mo. 1947).
17. State v. Taylor, 356 Mo. 1216, 205 S.W. 2d 734 (1947).
18. State v. Bolle, 201 S.W. 2d 158 (Mo. 1941).
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the sheriff, his deputy and the jury. This contention was overruled, the
court pointing out that as soon as the matter was called to the trial court's
attention prompt steps were taken to correct the objection. 19

B. Arraignment
The court reaffirmed the well settled rule that the withdrawal of a plea
of guilty after it has been entered is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court. The court, however, remarked that wherever the matter is questionable the trial court should permit the withdrawal of such a plea and
entry of a plea of not guilty. In this instance the record was devoid of any
evidence to show that there were any unkept promises or false representations made by the prosecutor, and it was clear that both the defendant and
his counsel knew that the court was not bound by the recommendations of
the prosecuting attorney, recommending a parole.20

C. Evidence
1. Presumptions
The court again ruled that a defendant is presumed to intend the natural
consequences of his act. In one instance the court ruled that a defendant,
by firing a pistol at the deceased or in his direction, was presumed to have
intended the natural and probable consequences fo the act and his conviction
for murder in the second degree was affirmed.21 A similar ruling was had in
connection with the use of a large rock in striking the victim.22
In another instance a husband was convicted of felonious assault with a
deadly weapon. The evidence revealed that his wife had used a stick or a club
on the victim during the course of the struggle between the defendant and
the victim. The court ruled that the wife in using the club was presumed
to be under the compulsion of her husband in using the club and, therefore,
attributed her act to the defendant. 23
2. Circumstantial evidence
In a conviction under the habitual criminal act for the crime of first
degree murder where the evidence was purely circumstantial, the court reaffirmed the well established principle that"... the circumstances, to warrant
a conviction, must be consistent with each other,, must tend to prove guilt
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

State v. Cochran, 356 Mo. 778, 203 S.W. 2d 707 (1944).
State v. Reynolds, 355 Mo. 1013, 199 S.W. 2d 399 (1947).
State v. Littlejohn, 356 Mo. 1052, 204 S.W. 2d 750 (1947).
Supra, note 17.
State v. Henderson, 356 Mo. 1072, 204 S.W. 2d 774 (1947).
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and not only must be consistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's guilt,
but must be inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis, including
the hypotheses of his innocence. ' ' 24 In this particular instance the court found
that the facts did not meet the test and the conviction was reversed and
the defendant discharged. On the other hand, in another case a burglary
conviction was upheld on circumstantial evidence which was held to meet
2
the test above set forth. 5
3. Confessions
In the case of State v. GordenP" the State offered the confession of the
defendant before establisling the corpus delicti by other testimony. The
basis for the admission was that the corpus delicti would later be established
by other testiunony. No other testimony was offered and the court, following
a long line of decisions, ruled that the confession alone was not enough to
establish the corpus delicti and was not admissible in evidence unless the
corpus delicti was otherwise proved.
Again the court had before it the admissibility of a confession obtained
after the defendant had been held without charge more than twenty hours,
in violation of the so-called twenty hour rule.27 The court ruled that the
confession was not invalidated simply because the man had been illegally
held, reaffirming the principle that the test of the admissibility of the con- fession was whether or not it was voluntary in fact.
In State v. Cochran s upon preliminary examination before the court outside the hearing of the jury the defendant challenged the voluntary nature
of the confession. The ,trial court ruled that under the facts the question
of whether or not the confession was voluntary was for the jury. The ruling
was sustained. In the same case the chief of police, who was outside the door,
was permitted to testify as to an admission of guilt made to a psychiatrist
who was examining the defendant.
4. Cross-examination
The question of the extent of the cross-examination of the defendant
was before the court in two cases. In both it was held that the cross-exam24. State v. Brown, 356 Mo. 1037, 204 S.W. 2d 729, 1.c. 732 (1747).

25. State v. Williams, 356 Mo. 1048, 204 S.W. 2d 748 (1947). (See also State

v. Murphy, 356 Mo. 110, 201 S.W. 2d 280 (1947).
26. 356 Mo. 1010, 204 S.W. 2d 713 (1947).
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4346 (1939)." See also the case of State v. Ellis, 354 Mo.
998, 193 S.W. 2d 31 (1946); and State v. Sanford, 354 Mo. 1012, 193 S.W. 2d 35
(1946), where the admissibility of a confession taken after twenty hours was fully

discussed.

28. Supra, note 19.
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ination was proper. The court remarked that the statute limiting crossexamination of defendants to matters referred to in the examination in chief
... does'not limit the cross-examination to a mere categorical review of the
matters testified to in the direct examination, but it may extend to any matter referred to or wthin the fair purview of such examination. "29
5.

Hearsay

An interesting case involving the question of hearsay evidence was before the court. The prosecuting witness in an incest prosecution had made
a written statement to the officers and the prosecuting attorney setting forth
the facts of the crime. She refused to testify at the trial, claiming her constitutional privilege against self incrimination. The State adopted a rather
novel procedure of offering in evidence the statement made by the prosecuting witness as proof of the offense charged. The supreme court very properly
remarked that this statement was hearsay and that the defendant had no
opportunity to either confront the witness used against him or cross-examine
this witness. The conviction was reversed.30
The defendant's attempt to show that he himself had applied to the
sheriff and prosecuting attorney for protection from the deceased was held
inadmissible as self serving in a homicide case. 3'
6.

Proof of other offenses

The question of proof of other offenses has always been a perplexing one
for both the State and the defense. In two cases before the court it was
ruled that proof of the offense in issue was such as would permit proof of other
offenses at different times committed by the defendant. In one instance the
charge was manslaughter and one of the asserted defenses was that the shooting was accidental. The court, while recognizing that the general rule excludes proof of other crimes, ruled that an exception was made where proof
32
of the other crimes tended to establish the absence of mistake or accident.
In another case the court reaffirmed the recognized exception as to the proof
of other crimes where the crime involved was a sex crime and stated that
29. State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081, 204 S.W. 2d 920, 1.c. 924 (1947); State v.
Howard, 205 S.W. 2d 530 (Mo. 1947); Mo. Rav. STAT. § 4081 (1939).
30. State v. Gorden, 356 Mo. 1010, 204 S.W. 2d 713 (1947). See also State
v. Cochran, 356 Mo. 778, 203 S.W. 2d 707 (1947), where the defendant himself
offered in evidence a letter from his deceased wife in which she indicated that the
defendant was losing his mind. This was ruled out as hearsay.
31. State v. Cavener, 356 Mo. 602, 202 S.W. 2d 869 (1947).
32. Supra, note 29.
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similar offenses may under certain circumstances be admissible in evidence,
particularly if they show a course of conduct related to the offense on trial
33
or with the prosecuting witness.
The defendant could not complain of reference to murder by the defendant of his wife some days after the inurder of the victim on whose case
he was being tried, where the defendant himself first brought the matter of
the wife's murder into the case. 4
7.

Impeachment

In State v. Hayes 3 the State attempted to attack defendant's reputation
before he testified as a witness. The court, in conformity with well accepted
precedent, ruled tnat the defendant is not subject to impeachment as a witness until he has testified or has offered evidence as to his reputation.
Defendant's general reputation for peace and quietude can best be
proved, the court ruled, by showing in the negative that the witness had
never heard any discussion charging the defendant with turbulence." In
this same case the court ruled that specific acts of violence are not admissible
in proving the victim's reputation as to turbulence and violence.
8.

Prior threats

The defendant in the case of State v. Meidle37 contended on appeal from
a 'conviction of second degree murder that the shooting was accidental. The
victim and another were trespassing and hunting on the defendant's property.
The State was permitted to prove prior threats made by the defendant, not
to the victim, but toward other trespassers on defendant's land. Defendant
had ofi other occasions made the statement that he was never in a position
to fire at trespassers before. This testimony was admitted on the theory that
it tended to prove a criminal purpose or intent, rather than accident.
'9.

Opinion evidence as to sanity

The court ruled that a defendant who offered testimony of three physicians who treated and examined him after he was charged and in support
of his defense of insanity, waived the right to object to testimony on such
33. State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S.W. 2d 723 (1947).
34. Supra, note 19.
35. Supra, note 33.
36. Supra, note 31. In this same case the court ruled that proof of the lodge
and church affiliation of the victim was not admissable in proving reputation, ruling
that it also was prejudicial.
37. 202 S.W. 2d 79 (Mo. 1947).
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issue by two other physicians who also examined him for the same condition.
The defendant had contended that the information given to these doctors
was privileged, but the court-ruled that he had waived the privilege. In the
same case the court permitted the State in putting a hypothetical question
to its expert witness to hypothesize the question based on its theory of the
case and ruled that the defendant's objection to the question was not good
because it failed to point out what necessary facts had been omitted or what
facts were stated improperly.38
III.

INSTRUCTIONS

In a number of cases the question of subjects upon which the trial court
must instruct, whether requested to do so or not, was before the court. There
were no new principles of law established in any of these cases, however.
Briefly, the court ruled that a trial court must instruct on self-defense where
there is any evidence thereof in a felonious wounding;3 9 that where there
is any evidence at all to justify the submission of manslaughter the court
must give such an instruction; 40 that the court need not instruct on the
4
voluntary nature of a confession unless such an instruction is requested. 1
In one case the court reversed the trial court on an instruction which
told the jury that although they might believe from the evidence that the
deceased when intoxicated was a bad and quarrelsome man, such fact alone
would not excuse accused for killing the deceased, on the theory that such
an instruction constitutes a comment on the evidence. This is in line with
42
previous cases which have condemned a similar type of instruction.
In another case an information was filed under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 4410 (1939), which is the section covering assault involving
maiming, wounding and disfiguring. The court's instruction was given under
Section 4409 which section covers an assault with intent to do great bodily
harm. The court ruled that the instruction broadened the information and
3
was too broad.4
38.. .&Wra, note 11. In connection with the waiver of the privilege as to examination by a physician, see also State v. Cochran, 356 Mo. 778, 203 S.W. 2d
707 (1947), where the court ruled that an accused who puts his sanity in issue waives
the privilege existing between physician and patient.
39. State ,&.Browers, supra, note 2.
40. Supra, note 21.
41. Supra, note 7.
42. State v. Manning, 356 Mo. 477, 202 S.W. 2d 18 (1947); State v. Rozell,
225 S.W. 931 (Mo. 1920); State v. Archie, 301 Mo. 392, 256 S.W. 803 (1923); State
v. Welch, 311 Mo. 476, 278 S.W. 755 (1925).
43. State v. Watson, 356 Mo. 590, 202 S.W. 2d 784 (1947).
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SPECIFIC OFFENSES

In only one case was there a unique question presented to our court
regarding an offense itself. For the first time the court was called to rule
upon a question of the meaning of the words "being out under guard" and
"custody of an officer" in connection with an escape from a state penitentiary farm. In this case the prisoner was about 440 yards away from the
guard at the time he escaped. The sole question in the case was whether or
not at that time he was out under guard or in the custody of the officers. In
construing Missouri Revised Statutes Section 4307 (1939) 44 the court ruled
that he was in custody, even though the guard was some yards away. The
court said: "Custody refers not only to the actual corporeal and forcible detention of a prisoner, but also to measures whereby one person exercises any
control over the person of another which confines such other person within
certain limits. To be under guard it was not essential that the guard be near
enough to appellant to actually touch him."' 5
V.

DEFENSES

,A defense which was raised in one case is worthy of note here. In the
case of State v. Sapp46 the defense was insanity. It was there very fervently
and ably urged that the*defendant was entitled to an acquittal if the evidence showed that at the time the defendant committed robbery he was
acting under an irresistible impulse to so do. The court in this case refused
to depart from the time honored precedent established in our state which
holds that the defense of insanity is available only if the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong and know the natural consequences of
his act, thus overruling defendant's contention.
VI.

SECOND OFFENDERS

the so-called habitual criminal act 47 which provides for the maximum
punishment for the offense involved if the offender has been convicted before was also before the court in two cases. In State v. Haanon"' the defendant was charged with burglary and larceny under the habitual criminal
44. "If any person confined in the penitentiarj for any term less than life shall
escape from such prison, or, being out under guard, shall escape from the custody
of officers, he shall be liable to the punishment imposed for breaking prison."
45. State v. Baker, 355 Mo. 1048, 199 S.W, 2d 393, 1.c. 396 (1947).
46. Supra, note 11.
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4854 (1939).
48. 204 S.W. 2d 915 (Mo. 1947). See also State v. Ward, 356 Mo. 499, 202
S.W. 2d 46 (1947).
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act. In that case the sheriff was permitted to testify as to an admission by
the defendant concerning -his conviction for the prior offense. The court
ruled that this was not in conflict with the general rule prohibiting the proof
of other offenses in a trial for a specific offense, stating that it was proper
to admit this evidencd to identify the defendant as the person convicted of
the prior offense. In the same case the court reaffirmed the accepted rule
that where the prior convictions are not admitted, the court must instruct
in the alternative permitting the jury to return the verdict finding the defendant guilty of the principal offense alone or of the principal offense and
also as an habitual criminal.
The court approved the proof of defendant's prior convictions by use

of certified copies of records from the Missouri state penitentiary showing
the defendant's six prior convictions. The court in so holding overruled the
defendant's contention that the best evidence would be testimony by the
record clerk.49
VII.

VERDICT

In one case the complaint was made by the appellant as to the action
of the trial court regarding an instruction to the jury'directing the correction of the judgment or verdict.50 The jury'returned a verdict assessing the
defendant's punishment at two years in the penitentiary "with clemency."
The trial court informed the jury that their verdict meant two years in the
state penitentiary and instructed them to return to the jury room and return
a verdict omitting the quoted words. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's action in this regard, pointing out that it is the duty of the trial court
to see that verdicts are in proper form.

EVIDENCE
A. WRIGHT*
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri during 1947 on evidence
law were, for the most part, based on well established rules and laws of
evidence set forth in previous years. This summary is primarily for the
purpose of touching upon points which might be considered interesting to
the readers, and to note cases in which various types of evidence were
discussed by the court.
JACKSON

49. Supra, note 10.
50. State v. Wood, 355 Mo. 1008, 199 S.W. 2d 396 (1947).
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S., University of Missouri, 1940, LL.B., 1944.
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NOTICE

In Lane v. St. Louis Trust Company, 1 the court held that it could not
take judicial notice of the laws of Germany. This was a suit to prevent one
Wackwitz from taking a trust fund. One of the allegations was that he had
forfeited his rights to the fund by virtue of the laws of Germany. There was
no pleading or proof of the laws of Germany. In such case, the court states
that in the absence of proof, it must apply the law of Missouri.
In State v. Wynne, 2 the court took judicial notice of the proceedings
before the Governor of the State of Missouri in the absence of objections.
The court, in Odom v. Langston,3 held that a trial court may take
judicial notice of the opinion of the supreme court in prior cases involving
the same parties and the same issues.
In King v. Priest,4 which was a declaratory judgment action by members of the St. Louis police force regarding their right to join unions, the
court took judicial knowledge of the organization, purposes and ordinary
functions and operations of labor unions, and stated that it was common
knowledge that the most common methods used by unions to acc6mplish
their purposes are threats to strike, strikes, collective bargaining agreements,
closed shop agreements and picketing. The court further took judicial
notice of the co-operation between labor unions and of the control ordinarily
exercised by national organizations over local unions.
INFERENCES

In Nash v. Normandy State Bank,5 the court states the rule that inferences of fact ordinarily do not run backwards. In this particular case, a
statement, "Yes, I know that . . "Iheard that," made in June was held not
to be sufficient to raise the inference that the witness had such knowledge on
April 11.
Baumgartnerv. Kansas City,6 again brought before the court the question of the failure of one party to produce a witness creating an unfavorable
inference against such party. This was an action against the city by the
plaintiff for injuries sustained when a coal hole cover, inbedded in the
sidewalk, tilted when the plaintiff stepped on it. The court held that the
1. 356 Mo. 76, 201 S. W. 2d 288 (1947).
2. 356 Mo. 1095, 204 S. W. 2d 927 (1947).
3. 356 Mo. 1140, 205 S. W. 2d 518 (1947).
4. 206 S. W. 2d 547 (Mo. 1947).
5. 201 S. W. 2d 299 (Mo. 1947).
6. 204 S. W. 2d 689 (Mo. 1947).
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city's failure to put on the stand its inspector, who had inspected the cover
before the accident when it was reported that the cover was broken, authorized the inference that the inspector's testimony would have been unfavorable to the city, where the inspector was still an employee of the city and
well and available as a witness.
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPETENCY

In Hoover v. Wright7 the court again held that a lay witness cannot
give his opinion as to the-insanity of an individual unless he relates the acts
and conduct on the part of the individual which are inconsistent with
sanity.
(a) Competency in General
State v. Perkins8 is probably the most interesting case dealing with
evidence which was decided by the supreme court during 1947. This was a
prosecution of the defendant for rape. The state introduced a phonographic
recording of the defendant's confession, which was alleged to be error., The
court states that this is a question of first impression in the state. It was
held admissible. The court stating that, where the proper basis is established,
such type of evidence is of inestimable value to the triers of fact in reaching
accurate conclusions. It was shown in this case that there,were no threats
or coercion; that the defendant knew that they were making the recording;
and that it was fully explained to the defendant that the recording could
be used against him. The defendant, among other things, alleged the
phonographic recording to be "an ingeiiious novelty." The court states that
such evidence has been used in other jurisdictions; that it is the same principal as taking motion pictures, and quotes at length from a California
case, People v. Hayes,9 "If after a preliminary examination, the trial judge
is satisfied that the sound moving picture reproduces accurately -that which
has been said and done, and the other requirements relative to the admissibility of a confession are present, i.e., it was freely and voluntarily made
without hope of immunity or promise of reward, then, not only should the
preliminary foundation and the sound moving picture go to the jury, but,
in keeping with the policy of the courts to avail themselves of each and
every aid of science for the purpose of ascertaining the truth, such practice
7.
8.
noted 12
9.

202 S. W. 2d 83 (Mo. 1947).
335 Mo. 851, 198 S. W. 2d 704 (1946) (rehearing denied Jan. 13, 1947);
Mo. LAw REv. 353 (1947).
21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P. 2d 321, 322 (1937).
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is to be commended as of inestimable value to triers of fact in reaching
accurate conclusions." (italics the court's.) The Missouri court concludes
that a proper foundation having been laid, the evidence was admissible in
this case. The court stated, however, that no complaint was 'made in this
case of the method of reproducing the voice. This limitation would seem
to be taken care of in the requirements of a proper basis for the admission
of such types of testimony.
In Johnson v. Minihan,10 the disclosure of a settlement between the
defendant and one of plaintiff's witnesses for damages to the witness's
automobile as result of a collision with the defendant's truck, while otherwise incompetent, was held admissible as an incident to the plaintiff's right
to have the witness, on re-direct examination, explain the circumstances
under which he signed a statement which was used on cross examination
to discredit the witness. The court says that evidence, admissible for one
purpose, cannot be excluded because it is inadmissible for another, although
the opposite party is entitled to have an instruction limiting the use of the
testimony.
State v. Hayes" was a prosecution for statutory rape. During the
state's evidence, a witness was permitted to testify regarding the defendant
having had women in his room on numerous occasions. The state claimed such
evidence to be admissible to impeach the witness. It was objected to on
the ground that it was an attack upon the defendant's character when the
defendant's character had not been put in issue. The court held that until
the defendant offered evidence concerning the reputation of the defendant,
the state could not attack it. It further held that the offered evidence was
not admissible, since it was not competent to show reputation. The court
followed the general rule that evidence of specific acts is not competent to
show reputation, but the testimony must be with regard to the general
reputation. The evidence was also held inadmissible in a statutory rape
prosecution of previous illicit relations. The court stating that it was not
admisible to show intent, malice or motive, since such showings were not
needed.
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter in State v. Slilkett 5
and appealed. The defendant had shot one McDaniels, and his defense was
that it was an accident. The state was permitted to show that the defendant
10. 355 Mo. 1208, 200 S. W. 2d 334 (1947).
11. 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S. W. 2d 723 (1947).
12. 356 Mo. 1081, 204 S. W. 2d 920 (1947).
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had shot the pistol on two other occasions the same morning. The defendant
alleged such evidence to be error, on the ground that it was allowing the
proof of the commission to separate and distinct crimes. The court held it
admissible to establish the absence of the mistake or accident in the firing
of the gun. The defendant relied upon an accident and this was admissible
to show that different inferences could be drawn from the actions of the
defendant other than an accident.
Chapman v. Breeze 3 presented a question of waiver of time for payment
under an option contract. The court held that evidence of both antecedent
and subsequent words, acts, and conduct of the optionor were admissible to
show waivers. However, the court reiterates that the antecedent words, acts
and conduct could not be used to vary the terms of the written contract.
Bank records showing credits, withdrawals and balances were held
material and competent evidence in Adams v. Moberg,14 in a specific performance of an oral contract for the conveyance of real estate action. Such
evidence was objected to, but the court says that it is material to corroborate oral testimony, although standing alone such bank records were
meaningless.
InI Callahan v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,'5 which was an
action on an insurance policy, the plaintiff offered certified copies of the
death certificate as evidence. The death certificate stated that the insured
died as the result of an accident. The doctor who executed the death certificate
testified that he was not present when the insured was injured. The court
held that the entire certificate was not admissible. Such admission, was
restricted to statements of fact within the knowledge of the person making
the certificate.
(b)

Parol Evidence Rde

Peters v. Jamison's Estate6 was a controversy arising from an application for an order of partial distribution and authority to deduct certain
amounts in a settlement in the probate court. The executors of the estate
applied to the court for an-order allowing them to take credit and deduct
from the respondent's distributive share the amount of a claim paid by the
estate on a written guaranty signed by the deceased, guaranteeing a brokerage account standing in the name of the respondent. Testimony was offered
13.
14.
15.
16.

355
356
207
202

Mo. 873, 198 S. W. 2d 717 (1946).
Mo. 1175, 205 S. W. 2d 553 (1947).
S. W. 2d 279 (Mo. 1947).
S. W. 2d 879 (Mo. 1947).
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regarding conversations and discussions between the deceased and her
sister, which were objected to. The court held that the testimony was
material and admissible upon the question of establishing who was primarily
liable on the contract with the brokerage firm, and that. it did not violate
the parol evidence rule, since the written contracts were not between the
two parties to the conversations.

(c) Best Evidence Rle
The best evidence rule was mentioned in two cases, State v. Miller"'
and Crampton v. Osborn.'8 In the Miller case, certified copies of a transcript
of the official records of the Missouri State Penitentiary, showing convictions and commitments, were held to be admissible against the objections
of not the best evidence. The objection that the official having charge of
the records was not shown to be unavailable for testimony was likewise
overruled.

(d) Cross Examination
The supreme court in a number of cases again affirmed the rule that
the scope of cross examination is ordinarily within the discretion of the
trial court. In Gildehaus v. Jones,19 it again stated this rule, but states that
cross examination as to collateral matters cannot be used for impeachment
purposes. They held, however, that cross examination as to prior marriages,
although not a material issue in the case as such, *tended to tie in with other
testimony which was directly material, thus was not error.
State v. Skillett 20 likewise presented a question of the limitation of
cross examination. The defendant complained of limitation by the trial cburt
of the cross examination of a witness as to collateral matters for the purpose
of attacking the credibility of such witness. The court held it was in the
sound discretion of the trial court and that it was not shown that the
defendant was prejudiced or that the trial court abused its discretion. The
limit of cross examination was reviewed in State v. Howard2' and State v.
Hannon.2 2

17.
18,
19.
20.
21.
22.

202 S. W. 2d 887 (Mo. 1947).
356 Mo. 125, 201 S. W. 2d 336 (1947).
356 Mo. 8, 200 S. W. 2d 523 (1947).
Supra, n. 12.
205 S. W. 2d 530 (Mo. 1947).
204 S. W. 2d 915 (Mo. 1947).
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Hypothetical Question

Hypothetical questions were reviewed in two cases, Golden v. National
Utilities Corpany23 and McGaugh v. City of Fulton.2' In the Golden case,
it was held that an expert's answer to a hypothetical question, stating that
gas escaping from a defective service line outside a house had entered the
basement, causing the explosion when a match was lighted, was sufficient
to make a case for the jury on the question of causal connection and that
this statement, being in answer to a hypothetical question, was not inadmissible because the hypothetical question did not contain all insignificant facts
in the record. In McGaugh v. City of Fulton, which was another gas explosion case, the plaintiff alleged error, among other things, in excluding
hypothetical questions asked by plaintiff of plaintiff's expert witness. The
court held that the question contained elements which were not based upon
an assumption of fact from which negligence could be inferred, so the objection was properly sustained. This was true especially since the plaintiff did
not ask the defendant to point out the defendant's objections to the question, or offer to amend the question to eliminate the defendant's objections.
(f)

Reputation

In State v. Hayes,2" the rule was again stated by the court, as above
mentioned, that evidence of specific acts is not competent to show reputation.
WITNESSES

In Golden v. National Utilities Company, supra, the court held that
expert witnesses giving conflicting opinions on the same set of facts make
an issue for the jury regarding the credibility of such expert witnesses. In
Holmes v. McNeil,26 the plaintiff sued for damages arising from an automobile accident. The plaintiff had testified in his deposition that the defendant was "slumped" over the steering wheel. The defendant claims that the
plaintiff is bound by this, that it established the defendant's defense of loss
of consciousness or control due to an outside cause. The plaintiff testified
that when he stated "slumped" that he meant "bent" over the wheel, and
not slumped as though unconscious. The court held that a litigant is not
bound by his witness's adverse testimony "... where the testimony is con23.
24.
25.
26.

356 Mo., 84, 201 S. W. 2d 292 (1947).
356 Mo. 1122, 205 S. W. 2d 547 (1947).
Supra, n. 11.
356 Mo. 846, 204 S. W. 2d 303 (1947).
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tradicted either expressly or by inference, by other evidence or circumtance, as where the circumstances or the evidence of other witnesses would
warrant the trier of facts in disregarding the testimony or drawing a contrary
inference."
ADMISSIONS
27

In Campbell v. Webb, the original petition which was subsequently
amended, was held competent as an admission by the plaintiff. However, the
court stated that it was not conclusive, and the plaintiff was not .bound
thereby. Likewise, in Holmes v. Egy,28 the court pointed out that the
plaintiff is not conclusively bound by her statements or admissions in her
deposition, taken before the trial, which are inconsistent with her testimony
at the trial.
PRIVILEGE

State v. Sapp29 was

a prosecution for robbery, with a defense of insanity.
The defendant was held to have waived the defense of privilege as to testimony of two doctors when the defendant himself introduced evidence by
three other doctors as to his mental condition, all doctors having examined
him for the same purpose. The court states, '.'Appellant could not be permitted to call as witnesses only those doctors whom he desired to call, and
then claim the right to object as to other doctors who treated and examined
him for the same condition." In doing this, the court followed the general
rule that privilege is a personal matter and can bewaived, and held that the
defendant had so waived his privilege in this case.
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILIA m H. BECKER, JR.*
In 1947 the decisions of the supreme court did not involve any radical
examination of the basis of the humanitarian doctrine. On the whole the
1947 decisions seemed to be genuine attempts to administer the doctrine as
a doctrine based upon fault; that is, a doctrine of negligence and proximate
cause based upon real dereliction of legal duty. There was no extension of
the use or operation of the doctrine except possibly in the case of Kenefick
v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis,' where the widow of an employee
27. 356 Mo. 466, 202 S. W. 2d 35 (1947).
28. 202 S. W. 29 87 (Mo. App. 1947).
29. 356 Mo. 705, 203 S. W. 2d 425 (1947).
*Attorney, Columbia, LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
1. 207 S. W. 2d 294 (Mo. 1948).
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killed in Illinois brought a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
in Missouri, and submitted the case under the humanitarian doctrine. This
submission was not disapproved. For a discussion of the use of the human2
itarian doctrine in such cases see the note in the Missouri Law Review.
It is questionable whether the same result would be reached in an Illinois
court, though the opinion is logically acceptable.
The vexing question of how to draft a defense instruction submitting
primary negligence as the sole cause in a case under the humanitarian
doctrine, was left in an unsettled condition. It could not be said at the end
of 1947 whether the court en banc would finally hold that a defendant's sole
cause instruction must negative the existence of defendant's humanitarian
negligence or not. Only a categorical decision of the court en bane can settle
this question.
Another year passed without presentation to the court of the crucial
question, concerning the very nature of the humanitarian doctrine, which
will have to be settled eventually. The question is this:
When two equally oblivious and inattentive vehicle operators
collide and are personally injured under circumstances where each
might have avoided the collision after the imminent peril of collision arose, can each recover damages from the other for personal
injuries sustained?
That case is likely to reach the court at any time. When it is decided,
the true natute of the Missouri humanitarian rule should become apparent.
Of course, the common law, last clear chance doctrine will not be affected.
Division Number 1

Fisher v. Ozark Milk Service3 involved an automobile collision at a
street intersection. The action was filed by a guest of one of the operators,
and was submitted to the jury upon (1) humanitarian negligence, after
discoverable peril arose, in failing to swerve, slacken or stop, and upon
(2) primary negligence of defendant in failing to provide its vehicle with
two sets of adequate brakes in good working order as required by ordinance.
The court, in an interesting opinion, held that, under the facts, the two
theories of submission were mutually inconsistent and that the submission
of both was error. This case is a plain warning that, except under unusual
circumstances, humanitarian negligence based on failure to stop or slacken
2. Parrish, Comments 9 Mo. LAW REv. 264-274 (1944).

3. 56 Mo. 95, 201 S. W. 2d 305 (1947).
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and primary negligence based on defective brakes, should not be submitted
simultaneously.
Sollenberger v. Kansas City Public Service Co.4 was an action under
the penalty section of the death act based upon the death of plaintiff's
husband. His'death resulted from the collision, occurring at night, at a street
intersection between an' automobile driven by the deceased and defendant',s
motor bus. The case was submitted upon the humanitarian doctrine in
failing to stop, to turn to the right, or to warn. The submission was sustained upon all three grounds. In passing on the submissibility of the case,
the court used the deductive mathematical *method to reconstruct the
relative movements of the vehicles involved.
Teague v. Plaza Express Co.5 involved one of a series of much litigated
actions resulting from a collision between an automobile (with guests) and
a truck at a highway intersection. 6
This case was an action by a guest. It is notable for its approval of
the use of the word "immediate" in the defendant's definition of "imminent
peril."
In a guest case, the court held, it is improper to require as a predicate
to liability that the plaintiff guest was seen, or could have been seen in
imminent peril. It is enough, that, without actual or constructive sight of
the plaintiff guest the defendant driver knew or should have known, from
reasonable appearances, that the host driver was oblivious of impending
collision and all the occupants of his car were in peril, because of the driver's
obliviousness. This is a matter that should be carefully noted in the
drafting of defense instructions where a guest sues one other than his host
under the humanitarian doctrine.
Spalding v. Robertson7 arose out of the striking and killing of a pedestrian at night by a motorist driving along a highway. The question of
liability was not in issue. The case is interesting for its discussion (not
settlement) of the proper manner to instruct on damages in a death action
submitted under the humanitarian doctrine.
Flint v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co." was an action for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's thirteen year old son who was
4. 356 Mo. 454, 202 S. W. 2d 25 (1947).
5. 356 Mo. 1186, 205 S. W. 2d 563 (1947).
6. White v. Teague, 177 S. W. 2d 517 and 353 Mo. 247, 182 S. W. 2d
288 (1944); White v. Plaza Express Co., 188 S. W. 2d 847 (Mo. App. 1945);
Teague v.' Plaza Express Co., 354 Mo. 582, 190 S. W. 2d 254 (1945).
7. 206 S. W 2d 517 (Mo. 1947).
8. 207 S. W. 2d 474 (Mo. 1948).
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killed in a collision between a truck in which he was riding and defendant's
passenger train at a private crossing in the country during daytime.
The truck approached the railroad crossing up an incline beginning
about twenty to twenty-five feet from the track. As the truck approached
the track, it gave every appearance of stopping and came almost to a stop
at the foot of the incline about twenty-five feet from the track.
The case was submitted on primary negligence in failing to warn and
on humanitarian negligence in failing to stop or to slacken speed of the
train.
The court held, consistently with prior decisions, that the duty to act
under the humanitarian doctrine did not commence until it was reasonably
apparent by the acceleration of the speed of the truck that the driver
intended to drive the truck into the path of the train. By deductive mathematical calculations the court arrived at the conclusion that a case was not
made under the humanitarian doctrine in failing to slacken or to warn.
Since failure to warn was not submitted by the plaintiff, the court did
not consider the question of whether a case of humanitarian negligence in
failing to warn was made. Under prior decisions in close cases of this character, the plaintiff would have had a much better chance to establish
humanitarian negligence in failing-to warn.

Division.Number 2
Osborn9

was a suit for damages by the parents of an eight
Wright v.
year old boy who was struck by defendant's automobile and killed while
crossing an open, straight, level, dry concrete highway at noon on a clear
day. The only surviving eye witness was the defendant driver who stated
that he didn't see the deceased until he hit him. The case was submitted
solely upon the humanitarian doctrine in failing to slacken, turn aside or
warn the deceased.
This case is particularly interesting as an example of a submissible
humanitarian case, based upon the killing of a pedestrian by a motor vehicle,
in which the driver of the motor vehicle is the only eye witness.
The failure to warn must have been predicated upon the obliviousness
of deceased to the approach of the motor vehicle. Apparently obliviousness
is inferrp.d from the few known facts about the actions of the deceased. Since
this point matter was not discussed, the question may be raised in a subsequent case.
9. 356 Mo. 382, 201 S. W. 2d 935 (1947).
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Transportation Co.,10

In Crawford v. Byers
an action based upon an
intersectional motor vehicle collision was submitted solely on the humanitarian doctrine. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Two instructions were held not reversible error. One defined "imminent peril," and the
other limited the duty of defendant to act to the time after plaintiff was in
peril and defendant's driver "saw and realized, or by the exercise of the
highest degree of care could have seen and realized," that plaintiff was in
imminent peril. The instruction defining imminent peril received approval
of the court but the other did not. The approved definition of imminent
peril is as follows:
"By 'position of imminent peril,' as used in the instructions of the
court, is not meant a place wherein there is just a possibility of an
injury occurring; it means a place and position wherein there is
certain danger."-"
Jants v. St. Louis Public Service Co. 22 was a damage action arising out

of the death of a motorcycle rider whose vehicle was struck by defendant's
stream-liner street car crossing at a right angle the street on which the
motorcyclist was riding. The collision occurred at night. The case was submitted solely on the humanitarian doctrine in failing to stop or to slacken
the speed of the street car. The defendant had a jury verdict. The defendant's "sole cause" instruction was approved.
The instruction did not require a finding that the defendant was not
guilty of the humanitarian negligence submitted as suggested in Long v.
Mild.13

The decision meets some criticism lately directed toward the court's
treatment of the "sole cause" concept"by the Bar.'4 Modified approval was
given to the second defense instruction, submitting the converse of the
plaintiff's instruction on the duty of the motorman under the humanitarian
doctrine. The court's remark concerning the lattet instruction that the
instruction "is good against the objection urged at the trial" will make the
wary hesitant to use it.
Kenefick v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis was a suit under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the wrongful death of plaintiff's
10. 201 S. W.'2d 971 (Mo. 1947). See, also 186 S. W. 2d (Mo. App. 1945).
11. 201 S. W. 2d at 974.
12. 356 Mo. 985, 204 S. W. 2d 698 (1947).
13. 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S. W. 2d 853 (1941).
14. Ball, The Vanished Sole Cause Instruction, 13 Mo. BAR J. 50 (April,
1942); Spaun, Sole Cause Negligence Instructions, 13 Mo: BA J. 19 (Feb. 1942).
15. Supra note 1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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husband who was killed when struck by a passenger train while walking
across the tracks on which the train was approaching. In approving a defense
sole cause instruction, the court said:
"One condition to a defendant's verdict in a sole cause situation
is defendant's freedom of causative negligence and this instruction
expressly so conditioned a defendant's verdict."
This statement should be contrasted with the holding in Jants v. St.
Louis PublicService Co.,16 where the court approved the sole cause instruction which did not require a finding of freedom from "causative negligence."
Logically speaking it is the lack of causation rather than freedom from
negligence which relieves the defendant of liability. But the court has held
that a sole cause instruction which does not require finding of freedom from
humanitarian negligence is misleading. This question remains unsettled.
Until the court en banc reconciles the divisions, it is the safer practice
to require a finding in a sole cause instruction that the defendant was not
guilty of humanitarian negligence as submitted in the plaintiff's instruction.
The striking and killing of the plantiff occurred in Venice, Illinois.
The case was submitted under the Missouri humanitarian doctrine. Since
the plaintiff lost below and appealed, it was not necessary to settle the
question of applicability of the Missouri doctrine. However, the court considered the case as if the doctrine were applicable to Illinois casualties, a
novel but by no means a theoretically unsound assumption.
INSURANCE
ROBERT E. SEILER*
In 1947, the supreme court decided seven cases dealing primarily with
insurance questions: One case involved an oral contract of insurance, two involved coverage questions conceming an employer's non-ownership automobile liability policy, one case involved arbitration, one involved breach
of warranty, one involved a question of doing business in the state, and another a question as to accidental means.
The case on the oral contract of insurance is Rassieur v. Mutual Benefit
Life Insurance Company," an unsuccessful action to collect on an alleged oral
contract of life insurance for $50.000.00. The court affirmed the general Mis16. Sup'a note 12.
*Attorney, Joplin, LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 356 Mo. 48, 201 S. W. 2d 173 (1947).
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souri rule that a soliciting agent is not authorized to enter into oral contracts
of insurance. The court points out that, in any event, the prospective insured
knew that whatever he and the agent agreed upon was subject to the approval of the insurance company.
The first coverage case is Forirv. Toman,2 a garnishment proceeding to

collect a $7,500.00 judgment for personal injuries. The court holds that the
'mere fact that the premium for a liability policy issued to the employer is
based on the renumeration of all the employees does not mean that all such
employees are protected by the policy. The court also holds that where one
person is definitely named as the insured in such a rider that ambiguities as

to the coverage afforded such person do not make the policy ambiguous as to
the person covered by the policy and do not extend the coverage to some
other person not mentioned.
The other coverage case is Linensclhmidt v. Continental Casualty Company,3 where the court holds that an employee named in the schedule of employees on which the premium was 'based in an automobile liability policy
with an "employers' non-ownership liability" endorsement is not covered
personally for an accident involving the employee's own automobile, when
not on business for the named insured. The court also holds that since the
employee was not personally covered that neither waiver nor estoppel could
operate against the insurance company so as to create coverage for the employee.
The arbitration case is Orr v. Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company
of Missouri,4 an action to collect on hail insurance on a cotton crop. The
court decided that the arbitration award, relied upon as a defense by the insurance company, was void as a matter of law. The arbitrator who donlinated the arbitration drew pay at the same time from the defendant as well as
pay from both parties for being an arbitrator, did not inspect the loss until
three weeks after the hail storm (the ground having overflowed in the meantime) and was unable to explain how he judged that the hail did not injure
the crop.
The breach of warranty case is Packard Manufacturing Company v.
Indiana Lumbermens' Mutual Insurance Company,, where the court, en
banc, held that the insured failed to make a submissible case in an action to
2.
3.
4.
5.

202 S. W. 2d 32 (Mo. 1947).
356 Mo. 914, 204 S. W. 2d 295 (1947).
356 Mo. 372, 201 S. W. 2d 952 (1947).
356 Mo. 687,203 S. W. 2d 415 (1947).
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collect on fire policies where it was undisputed that there were eleven gallons
of gasoline in the building for five or six weeks before the fire. The court holds
that the policy provisions that the policy"... shall be void . .. if (any usage
or custom of trade or manufacture to the contrary notwithstanding) there be
kept, used or allowed on the above described premiges... gasoline.. ."is a
warranty which will be enforced, regardless of whether the violation thereof
actually served to contribute to the fire or whether the insured had knowledge of the violations thereof. One judge concurred in the result. Two judges
dissented.
The question of whether or not the insurance company was doing business within the state so as to be subject to service of process is involved in
the case of Cindrich v: Indiana Travelers Assurance Company.6 The court
held that in doing the following the defendant foreign insurance company
did not "diiectly or indirectly issue policies, take risks, or transact business
in this state" so as to be subject to service of process on the Superifitendent
of Insurance under Section 6008, Missouri Revised Statutes of 1939: (1) The
re-insurance by the defendant, in Indiana, of Missouri contracts issued by
an insurance company authorized to do business in Missouri, (2) the sending
to the assured in Missouri, from Indiana, of the certificate of insurance and
premium notices from time to time, (3) the payment by the insured, from
Missouri, of premiums through the mail, (4) the sending of applications from
Indiana to various Missouri residents, (5) the return of same by mail and the
acceptance by defendant in Indiana of said applications, and (6) the mailing
of policies back to Missouri.
The accidental means case is Callahan v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company,7 an action to collect double indemnity for death resulting
from accidental means-frozen feet, resulting in tetanus. The court reaffirms
its position that there is a distinction between cause and result so far as the
term "accidental means" is concerned; that there must be something unforeseen, unusual,, unexpected which produces the injury, not merely an unusual
result. However, it was a jury question whether under the circumstances in
the case the freezing and death were caused by accidental means. Since the
freezing was not necessarily an accident, the insurer was entitled to have the
jury consider whether or not the deceased's acts were willful and voluntary,
including the question of intoxication.

6. 356 Mo. 1064, 204 S. W. 2d 765 (1947).
7. 207 S. W. 2d 279 (Mo. 1947).
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The court also holds in this case that the vexatious delay and penalty
statute, Section 6040, Missouri Revised Statutes of 1939, is not unconstitutional as imposing an undue burden upon interstate commerce.

PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT'
No attempt has been made to brief and discuss all of the 1947 property
cases decided by the Missouri Supreme Court. Many of the cases apply
well-established principles of property law, and the issues are primarily
issues of pleading or proof. In rereading the 1947 property cases I noted
with some satisfaction that most of the cases which called for analysis and
comment, becaus6 they were cases of first impression or because they
overruled or modified earlier Missouri decisions, already have been discussed by the- student editors of the Missouri Law Review. The large
number of exceptionally able students, many of them veterans, has made
it possible to make available to the Bar notes on recent cases and comments
on current legal problems soon after a case appears in the advance sheets.
Reference is made to these studies in the material which follows.
FUTURE INTERESTS

The most interesting and important property case in 1947 was Brown
v. Bibbh, a case involving the problem of virtual representation of unborn
contingent remaindermen in a suit to revive a deed of trust released of
record, to be subrogated thereto, and for foreclosure thereof. The case was
argued before Division Two, and the opinion of Bohling, C., holding that
there had not been virtual representation, was adopted by that division.
The case was transferred to the court en. banc and reargued. The majority
of the court en banc concurred in an opinion by Clark, J., holding that there
had been virtual representation. Ellison, J., dissented in opinion. Hyde, J.,
dissented in a separate opinion, in part written by himself and in part
adopting the opinion of Bohling, C. This indicates that probably no other
case in recent years has received more searching analysis and more careful
consideration.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 201 S. W. 2d 370 (Mo. 1947).
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The facts, somewhat simplified and reduced to hypothetical form were
as follows. In 1874 A duly mortgaged Blackacre to E. Later that year A
duly quitclaimed Blackacre to his wife, W, "and her bodily heirs" by A.
[This fee tail limitation gave a life estate to W, a contingent remainder in
fee to the heirs of her body by A (subject to the condition precedent of
being born and surviving W), and left a reversion in fee in A, all subject
to the prior mortgage.] In 1877 A wrongfully appropriated certain funds
from X, paid the mortgage note, and E released the mortgage of record.
A and W had a child, C. A died in 1888. In 1890 X brought the suit in
question to revive the mortgage, to be subrogated thereto, and for foreclosure thereof. The style of Xs petition was: "X, plaintiff vs. W, and C,
defendants." The petition, after mentioning W, alleged: "That the other
defendant herein is the only bodily heir of W." The decree found that C
was "the only heir of W." The land was sold to D pursuant to the decree.2
The sheriff's deed recited that the interests sold were "all right, title, interest
and estate" of W and C. The debt was $290, and the land sold for $415.55;
the record does not indicate what disposition was made of the surplus, if
any. C died in 1934, W still living. [C did not satisfy the condition precedent
of survival and never qualified as contingent remainderman.] C left issue,
P. W died in 1943, survived by her grandchild, P, issue of her deceased
child. [P was the only person who ultimately qualified as contingent
remainderman, and is now entitled to possession of the land in fee unless
his interest was foreclosed in the 1890 foreclosure suit and sale thereunder. I
P brings a quiet title and ejectment action against D. The trial court gave
judgment for D. This judgment was affirmed by a divided court in the
principal case.
Probably the most lucid discussion of the problem of virtual representation is found in the three volume treatise by Professor Simes, 3 a work
indispensable to the property lawyer. It is elementary that a mortgage foreclosure by suit should bind only those who are-made parties. On the other
hand, if an unborn and unascertained contingent remainderman who took
his interest subject to the mortgage is a necessary party to foreclosure,
then the mortgagee has lost much he bargained for. In the principal case

2. Actually the land was sold to the life tenant, W, but the court in the
principal case held that she purchased as would a stranger, and not for the owners
of any future interests.
3. 3 SnMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § § 670-687 (1936). § 681, Mortgage Foreclosure, deals with the immediate problem in the principal case.
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fifty-six years elapsed between the time the mortgagee was entitled to
foreclose and the time the identity of the contingent remainderman could
be ascertained. The mortgagee cannot be put off so long. The difficulty
generally is resolved by appointing a guardian ad litem to represent unborn
persons in the suit, or by the doctrine of virtual representation, the contingent remainderman beink "represented" by actual parties in the same
class, with identical interests, and who would be affected in the same way
by the decree.4
The first basic issue in the principal case was as follows: was there
such a community of interest between C, W's child, and P, W's grandchild,
that C in the 1890 mortgage foreclosure suit could represent P who was as
yet unborn and unascertained? The majority of the court, through Clark,
J., answered this question in the affirmative, taking the position that both
the life tenant, W, and her child, C, a potential bodily heir, represented the
unborn grandchild, P. Ellison, J., dissenting, took the position that W and
C both had interests hostile to P, W in that she might bid in the land for a
low price at the foreclosure sale, and C in that his interests in any surplus
after satisfying the mortgage debt were hostile to P. Hyde, J., and Bohling,
C., do not discuss this problem. On this issue, my own opinion is that
insofar as the mortgage revival and foreclosure were concerned, either W
or C could have represented P, but that insofar as disposition of any surplus
after foreclosure ,was concerned, W could not have* represented P, and C
could have represented P only if the principal or balance after paying the
life tenant a commuted lump sum were impounded to await the event.
Granted that-P could have been represented by W or C, or both, the
second and great issue was whether P was represented in the 1890 suit,
under the pleadings and decree. The majority through Clark, J., take the
position that it was apparent from the 1890 petition stating the limitation in
A's conveyance to W and her bodily heirs, that C might not ever be entitled
and that an as yet unborn person might be entitled, and that it would have
added nothing to expressly allege such a possibility, or that the interest of
4. Virtual representation of unascertained persons by reason of community
of interest is to be distinguished from a class action where potential parties are so
numerous that it would be impracticable to join all of them. See Missouri Laws
1943, p. 362, § 19, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.19 (Sup. 1947).
5. Ellison, J., at pp. 377-378 discusses the "first estate of inheritance"

doctrine. To the effect that this doctrine is not pertinent, see 3 SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 672, n. 7, and § 681, n. 63-66 (1936). Simes would limit the application
of the doctrine to the common law fee tail, which does not exist in Missouri.
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such unborn person was represented by a living party. Both dissenting
opinions rely on and quote from Freeman,6 as follows:
"But in order to bind the interests of persons not in esse the
proceedings must be adapted to that purpose. If no mention is
made of such interests, and the pleadings and judgment are founded
upon the theory that the persons in being before the court are the
only persons haying any estates or interests in the property, then
no interests are affected except those vested in the parties before the
Court. Whenever it is sought to bind the interests of persons not
then in being, the judgment must be one which 'provides for and
protects such interests by substituting the fund derived from the
sale of this land in place of the land, and ireserving it to the extent
necessary to gatisfy such interests as they arise.'
Both dissenting opinions) also cite caveats from a comment by a great
Missouri lawyer and scholar, the late Earl F. Nelson. 7 On the second issue,
my'own opinion is that the doctrine of virtual representation should not
apply when it is not invoked, and therefore should not be applied in this
case as to the 1890 suit.
Regardless of the decision in the principal case that the unborn contingent remainderman could be represented and was in fact represented
under the pleadings and decree, the decision does not indicate that the
pleadings in the 1890 suit represented good practice. It took a later adjudi6. FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTrrIoN § 482, p. 641 (2d ed. 1886). Compare 3 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 675 (1936): "The doctrine that unborn members

of a class are not necessary parties where there are living members to represent
them may be qualified by the prdposition that in the suit the identity of interest
between the born and the unborn members of the class should be indicated, and
the fact that members who are joined are representing, not only their own interests,
but also those of unborn members of the class, should be made clear."
7. Nelson, Ride of Representation 2 Mo. BAR J. 11-12 (March, 1931), who
made the following observations:
"In that case [White v. Campbell, 316 Mo. 949, 292 S. W. 51 (1927) ] counsel
were very careful to see that the petition specifically invoked the rule as to possible
unborn contingent remaindermen. This was done by alleging that the living contingent remaindermen, who were parties to the suit, were made such in their own
right and as representatives of any unborn persons who might become on birth
contingent remaindermen. If representation is sought of contingent interests by
joining as a party to the suit the holder of the first estate of inheritance, similar
-appropriate allegations as to such party representing contingent interests would
be made by the careful pleader."
"In Jackson v. Miller [288 Mo. 232, 232 S. W. 104 (1921) ] such allegations
were made in the petition. Such allegations are probably unnecessary, but as
indicated above, the careful pleader will so frame his petition, by incorporating
therein such allegations, so as to prevent any such question arising.
"Nevertheless prudent counsel will join all persons in being who may possibly.
succeed to contingent interests in order that no possible question of the binding
effect of the judgment may arise."
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cation by the supreme court to determine that title was good and to make
it marketable. It is submitted that title was unmarketable from 1890 to
1947: It is submitted further that the holding in the principal case does
not make title marketable as to other cases where the abstract of title
shows an action similar to but not identical with the 1890 suit here in
question. It is believed that in such a case an attorney should not pass the
title, but should require a suit to quiet title. Prudent counsel will properly
invoke virtual representation by specific allegations in the pleadings, not
only to insure that the resulting title is a good one, but also is a marketable
one.
St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Kelley8 involved a testamentary
trust, which provided for a contingent future interest which might not
vest for a period of lives- in being and thirty years. The court held that the
future interest was void under the Rule against Perpetuities, and that
consequently the whole limitation was void under the rule of Lockridge v.
Mace.9 The principal case has been ably analyzed in the recent number of
the Missouri Law Review.10
TAx TITLES
1

Moore v. Brigman is one of the infrequent cases in which a tax title
without benefit of adverse possession was held to be valid. In 1939 a parcel
was offered for sale for the third time under the Jones-Munger Tax Law
of 1933. Delinquent taxes, interest, and charges amounted to $108.98. The
defendant bid $155. The value of the property was variously estimated
from $200 to $800, and had been rented for $6 a month. The court took the
view that the $800 estimate was very substantially in excess of the reasonable
value of the land. The court stated the principle as follows: "The JonesMunger Tax Law contemplates a sale for a consideration sufficient to pay
the delinquent taxes, interest and charges, and a sale for an unconscionably
inadequate sum, which sum does not pay the delinquent taxes, interest
and charges, is a fraud upon the State, as well as upon the taxpayer." The
court concluded that although the consideration was inadequate, it was not
unconscionably so, and was not so grossly inadequate as to constitute a
fraud.
8. 199 S. W. 2d 344 (Mo. 1947).
9. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S. W. 1145 (1891).
10. Brandom, Recent Cases 13 Mo. LAw REv. 239-241 (1948).
11.

198 S. W. 2d 857 (Mo. 1947).
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A second problem in the principal case was raised by the fact that
Missouri Revised Statutes § 11132 (1939) provides that the purchaser
at a tax sale shall "immediately" pay the amount of his bid to the collector.
In this case the collector could not execute the deed at once because of the
congestion of business in his office. The purchaser paid his bid as soon as
the collector had prepared the deed, nineteen days later. The court held that
"immediately" meant "with reasonable promptness," .and that an inconsiderable delay would not invalidate the sale, especially where the delay was
caused by the collector's inability to execute the deed at once.
It was further argued that the deed was void because it did not recite
the first and second sales, but contained only the recital: "Whereas, said
real estate ...was by said collector offered the third time for sale

[emphasis added]. The court said: "The cases, cited by plaintiff, holding
tax deeds void where statutory requirements essential to a valid sale were
not stated in the deed (or were stated by mere conclusions) were cases
decided prior to the Jones-Munger Tax Law. A collector's deed in which the
statutory requirements essential to a valid sale under the Jones-Munger
Tax Law were stated by conclusions was held valid in Burris v. Bowers,
352 Mo. 1152, 181 S.W. 2d 520 [1944]. The r&itation, 'said real estate...
was by said collector offered the third time for sale,' definitely implies the
'2
two prior offerings."'
TAx LIENs

St. Louis Provident Association v. Gruner 13 definitively settles a question which vexed the state for many years-whether the annual real estate
tax became a lien by relation back at the date of the assessment, June 1
under the Missouri Constitution of 1875, or a lien at the time the amount of
the tax was ascertained some months later. Blossom v. Van Court 4 had
settled the question as between vendor and purchaser, with the holding that
the vendor was liable on his covenant against encumbrances as to taxes assessed prior to the conveyance, the amount of which was determined after the
conveyance. But the question had not been settled where a non-exempt
vendor conveyed the land to a tax-exempt purchaser. The principal case
holds that the lien attaches as of the assessment date, June 1, and that the
lien is not apportionable. The opinion is short, but a very exhaustive analysis
12. On the general subject of tax titles, consult GILL, MissouRI TAx TrrLs
(1938).
13. 199 S. W. 2d 409 (Mo. 1947).
14. 34 Mo. 390 (1864).
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of the principal case and earlier authorities will be found in a recent number
5
of the MissouriLaw Review.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

In Vanderhoff v. Lawrence"6 it was held that, where a tenancy from
year to year arises by virtue of occupancy and payment of rent under an
oral lease of farm lands which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
no notice is required to terminate the tenancy at the end of the period
stipulated in the unenforceable oral lease. The case is fully discussed in a
recent number of the Missouri Law Review.'
EASEMENTS

State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Jamess holds that the
State Highway Commission has the power to condemn the right of access
to highways, under the Missouri Constitution of 1945, Art. IV, Sec. 29.
The limited-access highway is a relatively new development, and presents
a multitude of legal problems many of which are as yet unanswered in any
jurisdiction. The best discussion of these problems is in a leading article
in a recent issue of the Missouri Law Review by Wilkie Cunnyngham, Assistant Attorney, Missouri State Highway Department.""
In Evans v. Roth,20 a case of first impression, the court held that
property owners showing special damage could bring suit in equity to enjoin
violation of a zoning ordinance without having exhausted the remedies
available under the statute and ordinances, where the statute and ordinances
did not provide a plain, complete, and adequate remedy. The case and its
ramifications are fully discussed in a recent number of the Missouri Law
2
Review. 1
Majors v. Bush 2 2 was an action to enjoin defendant from using
a lane
over plaintiff's land. The evidence indicated that prior to 1924 defendant
15. Aulgur, Recent Cases 12 Mo. LAw REv. 228-230 (1947). Presumably the
rule of the principal case will apply under the provisions of the 1945 Constitution,
the significant date being January I instead of June 1.
16. 206 S. W. 2d 569 (Mo. 1947), affirming Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 201
S."W. 2d 509 (Mo. App. 1947).
17. Russell, Recent Cases 13 Mo. LAw REv. 324-327 (1948).
18. 205 S. W. 2d 534 (Mo. 1947).:
19. Cunnynham, The Limited-Access Highway from a Lawyer's Viewpoint
13 Mo. LAw REV. 19-44 (1948).
20. 201 S. W. 2d 357 (Mo. 1947), reversing Evans v. Booth, 197 S. W. 2d
718 (Mo. App. 1946).
21. Icenogle, Recent Cases 13 Mo. LAw REv. 124-127 (1948).
22. 200 S. W. 2d 892 (Mo. 1947).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1

44

Randall: Randall: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1947

1948]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1947

389

used a lane on X's land, and plaintiff's predecessor in title used an adjoining
lane on his own land, the two lanes being separated by a hedge. In 1924
the defendant and the plaintiff's predecessor in title agreed to remove the
hedge between the lanes, grade a roadway, and maintain it for their mutual
benefit. The parties did remove the hedge and graded the roadway, each
paying half the expense, and thereafter defendant did some work in maintaining the roadway. There was considerable conflict in the evidence as to the
exact agreement as to the rights, if any, in the combined lane; it would
seem to be clear that there was no express oral grant of an easement of
way, but there was an "understanding" that defendant would use the lane.
The defendant used the lane continuously, without any friction, until 1942
when plaintiff purchased the "servient" land; thereafter disputes finally
resulted in this suit for an injunction. The plaintiff's theory was that the
defendant had a revocable license only, and that defendant's user for some
twenty years had been permissive and not adverse. The defense was that
there had been an oral contract to grant an easment, and that the contract
had been executed by the parties in pulling out the hedge, and grading and
maintaining the roadway [thus taking the contract out of the statute of
frauds]; and in addition that she had acquired an easement by adverse
user. Judgment for the defendant by the trial court was affirmed. The'court
held that on either theory the defendant had an easement.
The decision is sound if the parties originally intended a permanent
easement, but failed to evidence their intention with a proper writing. But
that is precisely the point where the testimony was least clear. Many cases
hold that such an "executed license" is irrevocable by reason of estoppel
arising from the licensor's "fraud. ' ' 23 On the other hand if the parties intended
only a revocable license, no amount of expenditure by the licensee will give
him an easement. 24 Judge Charles E. Clark would limit the "executed license"
cases to those where the duration of the privilege had been made clear:
"Instead of the picture of a licensor prevented by the courts
from taking advantage of his own fraud, it is suggested that a truer
picture is that of the kind, neighborly individual who finds himself
outwitted, under this rule of law, by a clever land-grabber. It is a
rule of good sense, sound morality, and hence good law that one
ought not to expect something for nothing. It is to be noticed that
23. Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267, 16 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1826), is the
leading case.
24. St. Louis National Stock Yards v. Wiggins Ferry Co:, 112 Ill.
384, 54
Am. Rep. 243 (1884), where the licensee spent some $12,000.00.
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here the ungracious neighbor who refuses to yield to the blandishments of anyone is the one who best protects his property. Surely
the law ought not to penalize one for acts of neighborliness. ' 2
With refeience to the alternative theory, adverse user, if the parties
in the principal case did not agree to a permanent easement, the defendant's
user under the license was permissive, and would not ripen into an easement
by user no matter how long continued under the license. In the principal
case, if the original agreement was not for a permanent right, adverse user
did not commence until 1942 or later when the license was revoked.
Eureka Real Estate & Investment Co. v. Southern Real Estate and
Financial Co. 2 6 was a case involving the termination of an easement by
abandonment. In 1900 a street railway company condemned a right of way
through a tract of land. Tracks were built, together with poles and a power
line, over the right of way, and a street railway was operated. On a date not
stated the Union Electric Company erected poles and lines on the land in
controversy pursuant to an oral agreement with or license from the street
railway company. In 1941 the street railway company abandoned service
over this portion of the line, removing the tracks, but leaving the poles
and power line to supply power to a part of the line over which service
had not been discontinued. The court, after pointing out that an easement
may be terminated by abandonment, held that an easement might be
abandoned in part and retained in part, and that in this case the street
railway company still had an easement to maintain a power line. The court
further held that the Union Electric Company had acquired no right whatsoever to maintain its lines by reason of the license from the street railway
company, this use not being within the scope of the easement originally
condemned.
ADVERSE PossEssIoN

In Johnson & Co. v. Mueller2 7 a vendor sued for specific performance

of his contract. The contract called for an abstract showing merchantable
title, but the abstract furnished showed a break in title. The vendor attempted to close this break by proving in the suit for specific performance
that he had acquired a good title by adverse possession. The court quite
properly affirmed a judgment for the purchaser on the ground that the
25.

CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHIcH "RUN Wrm LAND"

61 (2d ed. 1947).
26. 200 S. W. 2d 328 (Mo. 1947).
27. 205 S. W. 2d 521 (Mo. 1947).
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vendor had not furnished an abstract showing marketable title. The principal case is discussed in a recend number of the Missouri Law Review2 8
A related problem is whether recorded affidavits of adverse possession
may be used to establish a marketable title of record. This problem is fully
discussed in a recent number of the Missouri Law Review. 2 9 The use of
affidavits under Missouri Revised Statutes § 1008 (1939), the thirty-one
year statute of limitations, is discussed briefly in a recent comment in the
Missouri Law Review.'This comment is the most thorough study to date
of the thirty-one year statute of limitations. There seems to be in some
quarters a belief that there is some magic in the thirty-one year period.
Mr. Hawkins comes to the conclusion that there are few cases where-one
needs to rely or the thirty-one year statute, and that most cases can be
handled more satisfactorily under the ten or the twenty-four year statutes.
DE9ED
3

Woods v. Payne ' is a case of first impression. The signature on a deed
for land owned by a married woman was written by her husband, with her
implied, if not express, authorization and approval. She acknowledged the
deed before a notary public. The court held that the conveyance was effective.
Earlier Missouri cases lend support for the rule, but were much more limited
2
in their application.
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP

Clevidence v. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co." was concerned
with whether certain checking accounts, savings accounts, building and loan
certificate, and bonds were held by a husband and wife as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. The real parties in interest were the surviving
husband and the wife's legatees, and consequently it was not necessary to,
determine whether the husband and wife were joint tenants or tenants by
the entirety, because the incident of survivorship is the same in both types
28. Brandom, Recent Cases 13 Mo. LAW REv. 337-339 (1948). See also
Brandom, Recent Cases 13 Mo. LAW REv. 246-248 (1948), discussing Leath v.
Weaver, 202 S. W. 2d 125 (Mo. App. 1947).
29. Brandom, Recent Cases 13 Mo. LAW REv. 337-339 (1948).
30. Hawkins, The Thirty-One Year Statute of Limitations 13 Mo. LAW REv.
83-88 (1948).
31. 206 S. W. 2d 335 Mo. (1947).
32. State v. Carlisle, 57 Mo. 102 (1874), name of, witness signed to written
statement by another, at witness' request, he being too weak to sign.
Radley v. Meek, 178 Mo. App. 238, 165 S. W. 1192 (1914), one person may
authorize another to sign his name to contract (dictum).
33. 199 S. W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1947).
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of concurrent ownership. The statutory presumption of joint tenancy in
the bank accounts was raised by Missouri Revised Statutes §7996 (1939),
the accounts being in the name of "husband or wife" and the ledger sheets
or signature cards or both being stamped "either of them or the survivor
in case of the death
the presumption of
made to "Husband
affirmative evidence
*so held.

of either." There was insufficient evidence to overcome
joint tenancy. The building and loan certificate was
and/or Wife or the survivor of either;" there was
that the parties intended joint tenancy and the court

A more difficult and interesting problem was presented by the bonds.
They were purchased with wife's funds, and were not in the joint names
of husband and wife. The husband's claim was based principally on the
fact that at the time of the wife's death they were in a joint safe deposit
box, for which husband and wife had signed a "Joint Deposit Agreement"
included in the rental contract. The joint deposit agreement provided that
it was agreed between the husband and wife that all property placed in the
box shall belong "to said lessees jointly, as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship." On the basis of this agreement the trial court found a joint
tenancy and awarded the bonds to the surviving husband. The supreme
court reversed the trial court on this point. Without deciding whether the
joint deposit agreement raised a presumption of joint tenancy, the court
holds that any such presumption was rebutted here by the facts that the
bonds were purchased with the wife's separate funds and were not in their
joint names. There was "no evidence indicating that Mrs. Forster intended
to or did create a present joint ownership of these bonds merely by depositing
them in the joint box." While the court does not examine the problem at
length, it is clear from the decision that such a joint deposit agreement does
not ipso facto create a joint tenancy.
MORTGAGES
Lewis v. Gray"4 involved two principal points: first, whether a purchaser's interest under a contract for the sale of land could be mortgaged;
and second, whether such mortgage was entitled to be recorded, and hence
gave constructive notice, at least where such mortgage was in the chain of
title. In 1941 vendor and purchaser entered into a written contract for the
sale of land, under which the purchaser was to have possession, and the

34. 201 S. W. 2d 148 Mo. (1947).
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vendor was to give the purcha'ser a deed when half the purchase price had
been paid, the balance to be secured by a purchase money mortgage. This
contract was not recorded. In 1944 the purchaser executed a note to one
Lewis, secured by a deed of trust on his interest under the contract. The
deed of trust was duly recorded. Four months later the purchaser assigned
the contract to one Gray who later claimed to have no actual knowledge
of the deed of trust, although the evidence was conflicting on this point.
The principal problem was whether the assignee, Gray, took subject to the
lien of the deed of trust. The vendor's security interest under its contract
was not disputed.
The court held that after the execution of the contract, the purchaser
had equitable title to the land, an interest- which he could mortgage. The
soundness of this doctrine is beyond dispute. The "equitable mortgage"
resulting therefrom is equitable only because the mortgagor's interest is
equitable, and is to be distinguished from the various "equitable mortgages"
which equity creates, e.g., the deed absolute on its face held- to be aI
mortgage, or the parol transaction not satisfying the statute of frauds held
to create a mortgage, et cetera. The chief difficulty in the principal case
5
was the following statement in an earlier Missouri case:' "The equitable
title of the vendee under a contract of sale arises, if at all, through performance, or an unconditional tender of performance, on his part." The question
'in that case was whether the purchaser could require the vendor to convey
legal title, and the words "equitable title" were not the most apt where
the court meant "the right to a deed conveying legal title." In the principal
case the court properly confines the quoted statement to the facts in that
case.
The court further held that a mortgage of an equitable title was entitled to be recorded. The chain of title was as follows: vendor to purchaser;
purchaser to assignee. The recorded equitable mortgage was after the
purchaser got equitable title and before he assigned, and consequently the
mortgage was in the chain of title and the assignee had notice of it by
reason of the record.

35.

Wright v. Lewis, 323 Mo. 404, 410, 19 S. W. 2d 287, 289 (1929).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948

49

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1948], Art. 1

394

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

TAXATION
PAUL G. OCHTERBECK'
During the year 1947, the cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Missouri in the field of taxation covered many different phases of this
'subject. These cases are discussed under the following topics: I-Assessments-Increase in Valuation; II-Compromise of Disputed Claim for Sales
Tax; III-Drainage and Sewer Taxes; IV-Estate and Inheritance Taxes;
V-Exemption From Taxation; VI-Injunctive Relief; VII-Lien of Taxes;
VIII-Municipal Taxes; IX--"Involuntary" Payment of Tax; X-School
Taxes; XI-Tax Sales and Titles; XII-Unemployment Compensation
Taxes.
I.

ASSESSMENTS-INCREASE

IN VALUATION

In Siate ex rel. Lindell Tower Apartments v. Guise and State ex rel.
Daniel Boone Apartments v. Guise,2 the taxpayers were each given an insufficient notice of an increase in the assessed valuation of their real estate;
however, by appearing and contesting the increase, the taxpayers were held
to have waived the insufficiency of the notice of increase.
II. COMPROMISE OF DISPUTED CLAIM FoR SALES TAX
In State ex rel. St. Louis Shipbuilding & Steel Co. v. Smit, the taxpayer failed to make sales tax returns on the ground that the transactions
were in interstate commerce and exempt, with the result that an arbitrary
assessment was made. The taxpayer to avoid litigation offered to pay the
tax and 6% interest instead of the 3% per month interest due under the
statute. The State Auditor accepted this offer. After certain interstate sales
were held exempt from sales tax, the taxpayer claimed that the State
Auditor had no authority to compromise the claim for interest and that
the taxes should be refunded. The court held that while the amount of the
tax could not be compromised under section 51 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1875,4 still the State Auditor had authority to compromise the
interest penalty, and that therefore the compromise was valid and the tax
not recoverable.

*Attomey, St Louis, LL.B., University of Missouri, 1931.
-1. 206 S. W. 2d 320 (Mo. 1947).
2. 206 S. W. 2d 324 (Mo. 1947).
3. 356 Mo. 25, 201 S. W. 2d 153 (1947).
4. When this section was readopted as section 39 (5) of Article III of the
Constitution of 1945, the words "without consideration" were added. This addition
may permit the amount of the tax to be compromiised.
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III. DRAINAGE AND SEWER TAXES
In St. FerdinandSewer Dist. of St. Louis County v. Turner,5 a sewer
district was held not covered by the term "other political subdivision" and
the collection of delinquent sewer taxes was held not to involve "construction of revenue laws" within constitutional provision fixing the jurisdiction
of the supreme court.

IV.

ESTATE AND INHERITANcE TAXES

In Priedeman v. Jamison,6 a will directing that all inheritance, succession and estate taxes, assessed against testator's estate or any legatee
or devise named in will, be paid by executors, so that legatees and devisees
should receive legacies and devises in full, free of all taxes, was held not to
prevent the executors from recovering the allocable portion of the federal
estate tax from the beneficiary of an insurance policy under the provisions
of section 826(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. This section provides for
such recovery unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will. The foregoing testamentary provision was held not broad enough to include the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy. In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Poe,'
a widow's dower in the real and personal estate of her husband was held
properly included in his "gross estate" for federal estate tax purposes and
the whole federal estate tax properly paid out of the personal estate by
the executors. The question of whether the devisees of the real estate could
be made to bear their proportion of the federal estate tax was held not a
proper matter for determination by exceptions to the final settlement.
In the case of In re Gartside's Estate," the court determined the rule
to be followed in Missouri in assessing inheritance taxes where there is a
compromise settlement of a will contest suit. The court held that an heir
who brings a will contest is claiming the property in his own right under
the statutes of descent and distribution; that when such heir takes property under a compromise agreement in settlement of will contest, the legatee
renounces so much of the legacy and contestant takes the property as heir
and not as assignee of the legatee; and that the amount of inheritance tax
must be determined on the basis of actual distribution of property pursuant
to the compromise agreement even though tlqe will as a result of compromise
agreenient was admitted to probate.
5.
6.
7.
8.

356
356
356
207

Mo. 804, 203 S. W. 2d 731 (1947).
Mo. 627, 202 S. W. 2d 900 (1947).
Mo. 276, 201 S. W. 2d 441 (1947).
S. W. 2d 273 (Mo. 1947).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948

51

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1948], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

396

[Vol. 13

See the case of In re Burroughs' Estate,9 discussed under subdivision
"V" hereof on the question of a devise to build a Masonic Temple as being
exempt from inheritance taxes.
V.

EXEMPTION

FROM TAXATION

0 property was devised to a
In the case of In re Burroughs' Estate,2
trustee for the purpose of erecting a Masonic Temple in Mexico, Missouri,
to be used exclusively by Masonic bodies for Masonic purposes only and
in which no commercialism was involved. This was held exempt from
inheritance tax as a devise to charity. The court carefully pointed out that
where a portion of a building sought to be exempted from inheritance tax
on the ground that it was devised to charity is leased for commercial purposes, such property is not exempt, even though the proceeds are used for
charitable purposes.

In St. Louis Provident Ass'n v. Gruner,1 the court held that under
the statute prior to 1945 constitution, the state's tax lien on realty attached
on first day of June of each year for entire tax due during the following
year, and hence a tax exempt charitable corporation which purchased a
lot on February 26, 1944, was liable for all taxes due in 1944 on the June 1,
1943 assessment without right of apportionment.
In the case of Chamber of Commerce v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission,12 the court held that even though many of the activities of
the Chamber of Commerce were devoted to purely charitable purposes, still
it was not exempt from the Unemployment Compensation Law on ground
that it was operated exclusively for "charitable purposes" or "educational
purposes" where it had power under its charter and did in fact promote
trade and commerce in the community.
In the case of Chesed Skel Emetlh Society v. Unemployment Compensation Comnission,3 a non-profit cemetery corporation was held not exempt
from unemployment taxes. Cemeteries were expressly held not exempt from
unemployment taxes and the fact that the corporation was also engaged
in religious and charitable activities was held to make no difference.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

206 S. W. 2d 340 (Mo. 1947).
206 S. W. 2d 340 (Mo. 1947).
355 Mo. 1030, 199 S. W. 2d 409 (1947).
356 Mo. 323, 201 S. W. 2d 771 (1947).
356 Mo. 726, 203 S. W. 2d 454 (1947).
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VI. INJUNCTIvE RELIEF

In the case of Baxter v. Land Const. Co.,14 the court held that an
injunction suit or suit in equity will not lie where a taxpayer has an
adequate statutory remedy; that under the statute providing for hearing
after notice of property owners' objections by board of park commissioners
responsible for letting street improvement contracts and providing judicial
review of its determination, taxpayer had an adequate remedy; and that an
injunction suit to test the board's proceedings would not lie.
.. In the case of Kellams v. Compton,15 injunctive relief was denied after
carefully reviewing a school bond election. See discussion of this case under
subdivision "X" hereof.
VII. LIEN oF TAXES
6 the court
In the case of Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of Land,"
7 that the priority and
reaffirmed its decision in Spitcaufsky v. Hatten,1
parity provisions for tax liens provided by the Land Tax Collection Act"
applying to Jackson County are to be construed as operating prospectively
only.
9 the court held that under
In St. Louis Provident Ass'n v. Gruner,"
the statute prior to the 1945 Constitution, the state's tax lien attached on
the first day of June of each year. This same rule was followed in St. Louis
20
Union Trust Co. v. Poe.

VIII. MUNIcIPAL TAXES

A. Inspection fees. In the case of Kansas City v. School District of
Kansas City,2' the court held that regulatory ordinances of a city availing
itself of the privilege of local self-government requiring fees for the inspection of boilers, smoke-stiicks, fuel-burning facilities and elevators in so far
as applicable to inspections of the facilities of public school buildings were
not invalid as an unconstitutional usurpation of the powers of the General
Assembly.
B. Earningstax. In the case of Carter CarburetorCorporationv. City
of St. Louis,2 2 the court held that the City of St. Louis "earnings tax" of
14. 206 S. W. 2d 325 (Mo. 1947).

15. 206 S. W. 2d 498 (Mo. 1947).

16. 356 Mo. 1133, 205 S. W. 2d 568 (1947).
17. 353 Mo. 94, 182 S. W. 2d 86 (1944).

18. Missouri Laws (1943), p. 1029.

19.
20.
21.
22.

355
356
356
356

Mo. 1030, 199 S. W. 2d 409 (1947).
Mo. 276, 201 S. W. 2d 441 (1947).
Mo. 364, 201 S. W. 2d 930 (1947).
Mo. 646, 203 S. W. 2d 438 (1947).
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one-fourth of.one per cent on gross salaries, wages and commissions and
on profits, covering not only residents but nonresidents, with respect to
activities in St. Louis, imposed for general revenue purposes, was not a
"license tax" under police power, but a species of "income tax" or 'Cexcise
tax"; and that this tax was not within city's power, regardless of whether
imposition of pure revenue tax on nonresidents working within city is in
itself invalid, and notwithstanding charter provision authorizing taxes for
all general and special purposes "on all subjects or objects of taxation."
Since the decision in this case, the legislature has authorized the City of St.
23
Louis to *collect a similar earnings tax of one-half of one per cent.
C. Tax on bank stock. In the case of First Nat. Bank of St. Joseph
(Missouri Valley Trust Co., Intervener) v. Buchanan County,24 the court
held that the ordinance adopted by St. Joseph April 29, 1946, levying ad
valorem tax on shares of stock of all banks in city, was valid and operative
for 1946, since statutes expressly repealing the power of first-class cities to
levy such tax and the constitutional provision giving the state exclusive
power to tax intangible personal property, including income of banks, did
not become 'operative before July 1, 1946, when liability for city tax for
1946 was already fixed and hence could not be extinguished by the legislature
and was expressly continued by provision in schedule of the 1945 Constitution; and that the statute imposing a state tax on income of banks was
inoperative as to national banks in St. Louis during the tax year 1946i since
the stock of such banks was subject to an ad valorem tax levied by city
for 1946 and the power of the state to tax national banks is expressly limited to one of the four methods authorized by statute.
D. Bridge tolls. In the case of City of St. Louis v. Cavanagh,2 the
court held that an ordinance of the city of St. Louis requiring payment of
bridge tolls was valid, and enforcement of the ordinance against taxpayer
did not deny him due process, notwithstanding that original ordinances for
submitting propositions of bond issues to the people recited that the
bridge should "at all times be and forever remain" a free bridge, and that
the bridge was operated for many years as a free bridge. The power of the
City of St. Louis to repeal ordinances providing for a free bridge across
the Mississippi river was held incidental to power to enact them, and
1

23. Missouri Laws (1947) Vol. 2, p.
; Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7780.4§ 7780.12.
24. 356 Mo. 1204, 205 S.W. 2d 726 (1947).
25. 207 S. W. 2d 449 (Mo. 1947).
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aldermen could not bind their successors in office with reference to matter
of tolls, nor did taxpayer have vested right to have the original ordinances
remain in force.
IX.

"INVOLUNTAR'

PAYMENT OF TAx

In the case of State ex rel. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Howard,26 the court held
that where a foreign corporation that was doing business in Missouri had
amended its charter so as to continue in business for a longer period than
authorized under the, original charter and had again paid a-domestication
tax which was illegally exacted because, under the new corporation code,
a foreign corporation is entitled tohave a charter amendment extending
its corporate life filed and authority to do business continued without being
required to pay another domestication tax, and the corporation was faced
with forfeiture of its right to continue in business in the state and with other
penalties unless the domestication tax was paid, the payment was "involuntary," entitling the corporation to refund by state.
X. SCHOOL TAxEs
In the case of Linn Consol. Higk School Dist. v. Pointer's Creek Public
School Dist., 7 the court held that the statute requiring a common school
district to maintain an eight month's grade school, and the statute requiring
such district to pay tuition of its children who have finished the grades and
attend high school in another district, are mandatory to the extent that
the district can comply by levying the rate of taxes permitted by the Constitution; and that the difference between a debt incurred by school district
by voluntary contract and one imposed by mandatory terms of a statute
is that the former is void if beyond revenue actually provided for the year,
while the latter is valid if within the revenue which could have been
provided.
In the case of Kellams v. Compton,28 the court held that where a school
bond election was held and the board certified that 1,739 ballots were cast,
1,147 ballots for loan, 569 ballots against loan, and 23 void ballots, the
void ballots were not to be considered; that the bond issue received the
necessary statutory and constitutional two-thirds majority; and that where
the official notice of a school bond election stated that the purpose of the
election was to authorize the board of directors to incur indebtedness and
26. 208 S. W. 2d 247 (Mo. 1947).
27.

356 Mo. 798, 203 S. W. 2d 721 (1947).

28. 206 S. W. 2d 498 (Mo. 1947).
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to issue bonds for the purpose of erecting and constructing athletic field
bleachers, constructing and erecting a sixteen-room high school building
and a four-room elementary school, the notice followed substantially statutory language and projects were not so unrelated and incongruous as to
constitute logrolling and fraud on voters.

XI.

TAX SALES AND TITES

In Moore v. Brigmn, 29 the court held that a tax sale of realty worth

$200 to $800 at third offering thereof for $155, which was more than enough
to pay delinquent taxes, interest and charges, was not a "froud" upon the
state and consideration was not so grossly inadequate as to constitute conclusive evidence of fraud, warranting setting tax sale aside, in absence of
evidence of irregularity, mistake, fraud or unfairness.
In Kelley v. Waymeyer,3" a tax deed was held not invalid or defective
because the advertisement for the sale did not show whether it was for a
first, second, or third offer,- nor state the name of the owner of the land.
,In Kansas City v. Tiernan,3' the court held that where the city bid in
property at a city tax sale and the city treasurer issued to the city a tax deed,
but taxes for which sitle was made were transferred to back tax records and
carried as delinquient taxes, city did not acquire title by such deed and property was not exempt from taxation; and that where the city secured a
condemnation judgment December 1, 1928, under which the last installment
of assessments to pay compensation was due June 30, 1939, a special execution issued June 2, 1942, was not timely so that a sheriff's deed executed
pursuant to a sheriff's sale under such special execution was void as a muniment of title in hands of the city as against claim of a purchaser of property
at a city tax sale.
XII. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TAXES
A. Finality of Assessment. In the case of Henry v. Manzela,'2 the
court held that a taxpayer who did not avail himself of statutory opportunity to determine' the amount of unemployment compensation taxes due
by trial before the Unemployment Compensation Commission, with review
by circuit court and further review in appellate court, could not try the
administrative proceeding on its merits by a motion to quash execution based
on judgment for the tax.
29.
30.
31.
32.

355 Mo.
356 Mo.
356 Mo.
356 Mo.

889, 198 S. W. 2d 857 (1947).
1043, 204 S. W. 2d 744 (1947).
138, 202 S. W. 2d 20 (1947).
305, 201 S. W. 2d 457 (1947).
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B. Successor Employing Units. In the case of Bucklin Coal Mining Co.
v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,33 the court held that where
the owner of all stock in a coal mining company organized another company wholly owned and controlled by himself and caused all assets of first
company to be transferred to new company which continued predecessor's
business, new company was a successor employing unit against whom delinquint contributions to unemployment compensation fund due from predeces-Z
sor should be assessed and whose rate of contributions should be determined
by predecessor's employment experience.
In the case of Leibson v. Henry,34 the court held that where the directors of a corporation, after forfeiture of corporate license for failure of
corporation to file annual registration report and anti-trust affidavit, acted
beyond their powers as statutory trustees in that they continued to operate
corporation's business instead of winding up corporation's affairs, the
directors were personally liable for unemployment contributions which had
been assessed against corporation during contiiuance of operation of the
business after forfeiture of the corporate license. C. Corporationand Individual as One Employing Unit. In the case of
Waring v. Henry,35 the court held that the evidence sustained the finding
of the Unemployment Compensation Commission that the corporation which
operated a bus line and another bus line which was wholly owned, operated
and controlled by the majority stockholder in the corporation should be
treated as a single employer, within affiliate clause of Unemployment Compensation Law.
D. Exemptions. See discussion under 'V" hereof relating to cemetery
corporation and chamber of commerce which unsuccessfully claimed that
they were exempt from Unemployment taxes.

TORTS
GLENN

A. MCCLEARY*

The increase in the work of the court during the year is seen in the
number of decisions involving liability for tort. There seemed to be a larger
number of interesting situations to be decided under familiar. doctrines in
33. 356 Mo. 313, 201 S.W. 2d 463 (1947).
34. 356 Mo. 953, 204 S. W. 2d 310 (1947).
35. 356 Mo. 749, 203 S. W. 2d 470 (1947).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
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this field of the law. For adequacy of treatment the cases involving the
humanitarian doctrine are discussed elsewhere in this issue by Mr. Becker.

I.

NEGLIGENCE

A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Suppliers of gas and electricity
The defendant, in Golden v. National Utilities Co.,1 furnished artificial
gas to the general public in Brookfield and was charged 'with permitting
some of such gas to leak from its service pipe leading from the main in the
street to the 'plaintiff's basement, so that gas accumulated therein and exploded, thereby causing the death of plaintiff's wife when she went to the
basement to light the gas water heater. The petition charged general
negligence. The defendant contended on appeal that no submissible* case
was made for the jury because the record disclosed no actual or constructive
notice to the defendant of the escape of its gas. The evidence showed that
the gas pipes had been laid more than forty years, were wrought iron and
subject to coirosion and rust. A previous tenant of the premises had made
three complaints about the low gas pressure,' these complaints extending
over a period of approximately seven months, the last complaint being
about eight months prior to the explosion in question. At the time of the
last complaint the service representative of ihe defendant dug up six or
eight feet of the approximately foity-five feet of the service pipe, the
portion excavated being between the street and the curbing in front of the
house. It was found to be "stopped up, corroded, rusted out," and, being
unfit for use, was removed and replaced with new pipe. There was a leak
in that pipe. The service representative did not know of the condition of
the remainder of the service pipe, but testified that there was no reason to
believe it was in any better condition than the portion removed. However,
the remainder of the service pipe extending on in to the house was neither
excavated for examination nor checked for leaks. After the explosion in
question, an excavation of another portion of the service pipe between the
side-walk and the curbing, and only eight or ten inches nearer the house
than the portion excavated earlier, developed that there was a large hole,
an inch and a half in size, in that portion of the service pipe. That hole was
only 41 feet from the house anal was sufficient to let all gas out of the
service pipe. Some time later the entire service pipe extending on into the

1. 356 Mo. 84, 201 S. W. 2d 292 (1947).
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basement of the house was excavated, and was found to be rusty and cracked
open at a point only twenty-one feet from the house. The soil around the
pipe along the entire s6rvice line to the basement wall was a bluish gray,
indicating escaped gas. The evidence also disclosed that the basement wall
had cracks therein. The court ruled that the facts constituted sufficient
notice not only of a dangerous condition, but that gas might seep into the
plaintiff's nearby basement and be caused to explode. While the defendant
was not an insurer, it was carrying in its pipe near to and in to the residence
a commodity which was known to be highly dangerous, because of its wellknown tendency to escape from the mains and percolate through the earth
into cavities or openings, and there burn or explode. The defendant under
these facts is charged with a very high degree of care in the transmission
and control thereof commensurate with the dangerous character of the commodity it handles, and should be"constantly vigilant to keep the gas confined in its pipes. "There was a duty," held the court, "on appellant (the
defendant below) to find out whether gas was escaping from other parts
of the service pipes, but instead of making further examination appellant
was content to excavate and replace only six or eight feet of the service line."
On an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff for the death of the
plaintiff's husband as a result of coming into contact with high voltage
electric current on the platform of a substation of the emloyer of the husband, the defendant contended, in Atherton, &.Kanrsas City Power & Light
Co.,2 that it owed the deceased no duty to warn and therefore was not
negligent. In holding an electric utility to the highest degree of care and
foresight, the court pointed out that "Electricity is the most dangerous and
deadly agency known to man, subtle and invisible, and ordinarily incapable
of being detected by the unskilled in electricity." While the substation was
located on property of the employer of the deceased and the employer exercised control over it, the defendant was also interested in its operation as
its business was generating and selling electric energy for profit. It had the
duty of rendering adequate service to all patrons; and in making Aispections
was promoting its own business. The defendant had inspected the 'substation two days before the accident and had made recommendations to
the deceased, a man inexperienced in electrical substation construction. At
the time of his death, the deceased as production manager for his employer
and having general supervision over the substation was complying at the
1948]

2. 356 Mo. 505, 202 S. W. 2d 59 (1947).
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defendant's suggestion with the defendant's recommendations for the maintenance of the substation. There was evidence that he was on the platform
at the time of his death because of the recommendations. The deceased had
been warned to open the pole top switch and lock it, which was done, but
he had not been warned that the pulling of this switch did not disconnect
the electric energy from moving over the circuit through the lightning arresters. Evidently the deceased being inexperienced with substation construction proceeded on the theory that the substation had been de-energized
upon his disconnecting the pole top switch and that it was safe to work at
that place. He came in contact with the lightning arresters or wires leading
thereto containing 13,200 volts of electric power. There was substantial
evidence that the defendant's inspector had not warned the deceased about
the dangers connected with the lightning arresters. It was held that the
plaintiff made a submissible case of negligence on these facts.
2. Railroads and other carriers
In Maxie v. Gulf, M. & 0. R. R.,3 the action was under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act for personal injuries received by the plaintiff who
was employed by the defendant in repairing and rebuilding its freight cars
at one of its shops, when four boxcar doors, standing behind him, fell upon
him. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed, one of the
grounds for the appeal being the refusal of the trial court of the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict based on the alleged failure of the plaintiff
to prove facts sufficient to bring his case under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The act, as amended in 1939, provides that "any employee of a
carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance
of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely
and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the
purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier
in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this
chapter." (italics the court's.) The trialcourt instructed the jury, as a
matter of law, that at the time plaintiff was injured he "was engaged in interstate commerce or was engaged in the performance of duties in furtherance of interstate commerce." It was admitted that the defendant was
engaged in interstate commerce 'at the time the plaintiff was injured, that
the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant when injured, and that he
was working at his usual place in the railroad yard and was working on one
3. 356 Mo. 633, 202 S. W. 2d 904 (1947).
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of defendant's freight cars. The defendant contended that the freight car
was not in interstate commerce at the time when plaintiff was working on
it, since it was "dead in the yards."' The evidence showed that the defendant
maintained two repair tracks at its shop in Mobile, Alabama. Upon one of
these repair tracks the defendant ordinarily placed freight cars requiring
"running repairs." The cars on this track were put in, repaired and gotten
out on the same day and so "kept running." On the other repair track,
the defendant placed other cars requiring from light to heavy repairs. These
cars were usually empty and remained on the repair track until they were
repaired, the cars usually remaining three to six days on this track. If complete rebuilding was required, it might take as much as one or two weeks.
On the track where the plaintiff worked, few cars, if any, were repaired
in less than three days and often a week or more was required to complete
the repairs. Most of the cars on which the plaintiff worked were empty. The
car upon which the plaintiff was working at the time of the injury had left
East St. Louis, Illinois, September 17, and moved interstate to Mobile, Alabama. During part of the trip it was loaded. It reached the defendant's
shops October 16, and was given heavy repairs and re-painted. 'The work
was completed by October 23, the day of the accident, and the car was
ready to be moved out. On October 28, the same car, loaded with freight,
was delivered to the Southern Railroad for shipment to a point in Tennessee. It further appeared from the evidence that freight cars, which had
been used by defendant in interstate commerce, were regularly repaired in
these shops, and that many of such cars, after receiving heavy repairs on
the repair track where the plaintiff was employed, were put back into use
in interstate commerce. In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff, the
court held on this evidence that the plaintiff was engaged in "furtherance
of interstate commerce" within the meaning of the Act, and that while it
was not shown that the freight car upon which the plaintiff was working,
nor that any other particular car upon which plaintiff worked, was expressly destined to or set apart for interstate rather than intrastate commerce, yet the facts showed that in the regular course of defendant's business, the cars had been so used and the repaired cars would be and were
being so used in interstate commerce.
Interesting questions are presented in Floyd v. Thompson,4 where the
action was by an infant for the wrongful death of his father as a result
4. 356 Mo. 250, 201 S. W. 2d 390 (1947).
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of alleged violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The defendant,
as trustee for the St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., had a judgment in the
trial court and the plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff's decedent and the decedent's
brother were partners engaged in the business of .salvaging scrap metal
which they shipped by rail. The defendant had "spotted" two coal cars
for loading with scrap on a spur track which had a grade of about three
per cent. On the day of the fatality, the brothers and their employees were
unloading "junk" automobile motors, weighing an average of about 350
pounds, from.the elevated bed of a dump truck into one of the cars. The
bed of the dump truck had been so elevated and extended that the "tail
end" would stick over into the car. The brake ends of the two cars were
together. It was contemplated that the brothers or their employees would
move and reset the cars when necessary for loading. As loading progressed
and the end of one of the cars had been filled with scrap motors, it became
necessary to move the cars. As the deceased and one of the employees
undertook to manipulate the brakes, the cars starting moving. No scotches
had been placed on the rails at the point where the cars were to be stopped.
Due to a failure of the brakes on one of the cars to hold, the "tail end"
of the elevated truck was struck by one of the cars, causing a scrap motor
to roll from the elevated bed of the dump truck toward the deceased,
obliging the men to leave their positions between the two cars, and causing
the deceased to fall or to be knocked under the wheels of one of the cars.
Since the deceased was not an employee of the defendant interstate carrier,
one of the questions was whether the Federal Safety Appliance Act may be
the basis of an action for death or personal injury in -this case. The court
interpreted the Act as applicable on the ground that, while not actually
an employee of the defendant carrier, the deceased was within the class of
persons entitled to the protection of that Act in its requirement that cars
must be equipped with efficient hand brakes. The defendant had conceded
that the deceased under his contractual relations with the defendant had
occasion to manipulate the brakes of the car when loading. Another question
was whether the defense of contributory negligence was available in an
action based on the Federal Safety Appliance Act. The Act itself contains
no bar to that defense. The Federal Employers' Liability Act does contain
a provision affecting the defense of contributory negligence, but that Act
is applicable only to employees of common carriers while engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, whether the defense of contributory negligence
was available, where the action is based on the Federal Safety Appliance Act,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/1
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was to be determined in accordance with applicable state law. Under Missouri law violation of the Act on the part of the defendant constituted
negligence per se but the defense of contributory negligence-was available.
In view of the incline of the track, the positions assumed by the deceased
about the cars, the inexperience of the deceased and the employee in the use
of the type of brakes with which the cars were equipped, the court properly
left to the jury the question as to whether the deceased used ordinary care
of his own safety in releasing or causing the hand brake .to be released, without taking precautions of scotching the car wheels or moving the bed of
the dump truck away from the car. The judgment for the defendant was
affirmed.
Another decision involving liability under the Federal Safety Appliance
Act to one not an employee of the railroad is Rsusk v. Thompson.5 The
action against the defendant, trustee for the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway
Co., was for personal injuries allegedly caused by use of a railroad car with
inefficient hand brakes in violation of the Act. On appeal from a judgment
for the plaintiff, one of the contentions made by the defendant was that
there was no liability under the Act because the defendant was not acting
as a common carrier, the car not being used upon the defendant's line at
the time of the accident. The evidence showed that 'the plaintiff, an employee of the Quarter-master's Department of the United States Army on
the Government reservation at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, was injured
while unloading coal on the switch track, known as the coal spur, from a
hopper bottom railroad car onto a conveyor, over which the car had been
spotted, when it was struck by another car. The Government had constructed
and owned the railroa2 track with its switch and spurs. This line connected
with the defendant railroad some distance away from the Fort. The Gov-,
ernment had no engines or rolling stock or crews or inspectors or repairmen
to operate thereover. By a contract with the Government, the defendant
agreed to maintain and operate the facilities and trackage with their own
equipment and crews for the purpose of furnishing government freight and
passenger or troop service between the junction and Fort Leonard Wood,
including switching at the latter point, but the railroad "shall not perform
any common carrier service over said railroad tracks of Government." The
defendant had the exclusive right to operate all freight, passenger and switching services to be rendered over the tracks and had covenanted to be re-

5. 356 Mo. 568, 202 S. W. 2d 800 (1947).
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sponsible for the inspection -and'maintenance and repair of all the rolling
stock moving over said tracks, agreeing to save the Government harmless
from all claims for injuries resulting from any act or omission of defendant
in the operation and maintenance by the defendant of the facilities. While
the plaintiff was attempting to complete the emptying of one of the coal
cars, other men started the next car rolling toward the conveyor for unloading. This was a Wabash car loaded with coal, the shipment having
originated in Illinois and destined to Fort Leonard Wood, and was standing
about 100 feet from the conveyor. Due to defective hand brakes, the
Wabash car could not be stopped before it collided with the car in which
the plaintiff was working, causing the plaintiff to fall and the resulting
injuries. The court held that the defendant was, under these facts, a common carrier within the Safety Appliance Act; also that liability could not
be defeated by reason of its contract with the Government. "The Government's track became a part of defendant's line of railroad; i.e., a railroad
engaged in interstate commerce, facilitating the rendition of common carrier
service by defendant to the Government and to the general public having
occasion to use defendant's services in the transaction of business with the
Government; and Wabash car No. 34174 was a car used on defendant's 'line'
in said service at the time of plaintiff's injury." The defendant had also contended that the lrimary -purpose of the Safety Appliance Act was for the
protection of employees and travelers upon the railroads and not for the
protection of persons like the plaintiff, a Government employee engaged in
unloading coal. That portion of the title of the Act material to the case
reads: "An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads

.

.

,

and for other purposes." The court interpreted the Act as ex-

tending its provisions beyond the protection of "employees and travelers upon railroads" to persons like the plaintiff, for "efficient hand brakes promote
the safety of those who have to move coal cars on spur tracks for the purpose of unloading them as well as the safety of the employees of the railroad."
- In Hampton v. Wabask R. R.,6 the administratrix of her husband's
estate brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against
the defendant for the death of the husband who was killed by one of the
defendant's trains. At the time of his death he was in charge of a gang of
men, engaged in raising, ballasting, lining up, and straightening the railroad
6. 356 Mo. 999, 204 S. W. 2d 708 (1947).
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track. The track would be raised by jacks, ballast would be shoveled under
the ties, and then the deceased with other men working under him would
tamp the ballast with eight air hammers before replacing the track. The work
was being done in a deep cut on a long curve, the banks of the cut being
covered with trees, brush, and shrubbery which tended further to reduce the
extent of visibility around the curve to a limit of about 200 feet. Under the
defendant's rules, enginemen were to sound the whistle when approaching
curves, and when the view was restricted by weather or other unusual conditions enginemen were to sound the whistle at frequent intervals to warn
trackmen and others. There was evidence that it was also the practice
to sound the whistle all the way around curves in cuts for the protection
of the men that might be working on the curve. Because of this long
established practice, section men expected and relied upon such. warnings.
The issue of negligence submitted by the plaintiff was the failure to sound
a warning upon going into the curve, and while going around the curve into
the cut. Without a whistle the approach of a train could not be heard by

the men working at the hammers operated by compressed air, and there
was conflicting evidence whether a whistle, if given could have been heard
by men working at the hammer. The evidence was undisputed that no
whistle was sounded after a warning for a highway crossing was begun

about a quarter of a mile before the curve began, and the custom of
whistling around curves was not observed, although a "slow board" had been
placed at the side of the track about, one mile from the place where the
deceased was working and train orders had been issued giving notice

that men were working on the track in the cut where the extent of visibility
of the train crew was greatly reduced. The ten men at the hammers, including plaintiff's husband, were killed by one of the defendant's trains
going 75 miles per hour. The court held that these facts constituted sub7
stantial evidence of negligence so as to warrant a recovery under the Act.

7. Other cases involving the liability of railroads which do not raise issue of
sufficient importance to be set forth at length. In Meierotto v. Thompson, 356 Mo.
32, 201 S. W. 2d 161 (1947), a fireman was not precluded from recovering under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for the loss of an eye which was injured during an
attempted repair of a pipe on an engine, on the ground that there was no violation
of the Boiler Inspection Act, because the engine had been allegedly taken out of
service and was not in use, where entire freight train was placed on sidetrack primarily to permit another train to pass over the main line of track, thle attempted repair
being made during such wait, and the jury was authorized to find under the evidence
that the disconnected pipe rendered the locomotive unsafe to operate without peril to
life and limb so as to make the Act applicable. Hold v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St.
Louis, 356 Mo. 412, 201 S. W. 2d 958 (1947), was an action for death of switchman
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3. Automobiles
Most of the cases -involving liability arising from automobile collisions
decided in the period under review were submitted on humanitarian negligence and are discussed elsewhere in this issue." Three cases in which liability
was predicated on primary negligence turned on whether there was sufficient
evidence to go to the jury as raised by defendant's motion for a directed
verdict. Schoen v. Plaza Express Co.9 was an action by the administratrix
for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent in an automobile-truck collision
on the theory that the defendants failed to keep the truck "as close to the
righthand side of the highway as practicable." The 'circumstanc6s of the
collision were not definitely stated by any eyewitness. Plaintiff's decedent
was traveling southwardly and the tractor-trailer northwardly. Circumstantial evidence that the automobile which the deceased was driving collided at an angle with the left side of the tractor-trailer combination, and
that the automobile and loosened parts of both vehicles were found on the
automobile driver's right hand side of the highway, with the automobile
door on the other side of the highway, was held insufficient to make a prima
facie case for the jury on the issue of alleged negligent operation of the truck
too far from its righthand side of the highway. There was no direct evidence
given for the plaintiff as to the movement and the relative positions of the
tractor-trailer truck and the automobile upon the highway immediately
who was run over by cars while crossing the tracks to line up another switch. Whether railroad was negligent in that switch foreman should have waited until the
switchman reached the switch stand and originated a signal for movement of the
trains, and to see that the switchman was in no danger before giving a signal for
movement of the train, and whether the switchman was contributorily negligent in
assuming that a movement of cars would not be made until he had inspected the
switch and had given the signal to move the train, where a .train was passing on a
nearby track at great speed accompanied with an appreciable amount of noise, were
for the jury. Cooper v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 356 Mo. 482, 202 S. W. 2d
42 (1947), involved the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an instruction to find for
the plaintiff, in an action for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's wife when a passenger on defendant's bus, if the bus door was closed on the sleeve or other part of her
outer coat while she was exercising ordinary care while getting off of the bus, and
the bus started before she could get away therefrom, pulling her along the side of the
bus while it was moving and knocking her under the front wheel and running over
her. Rose v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 205 S.W. 2d 559 (Mo. 1947), was an
action to recover for personal injuries, alleged to have been sustained when plaintiff
was allegedly thrown from one of defendant's busses by an unusual motion of the
bus as it was coming to. a stop.to let plaintiff and others off. There was sufficient
evidence to sustain an instruction given on behalf of the defendant to the effect
that the bus had come to a stop at the time the plaintiff attempted to alight therefrom, that the plaintiff fell as she stepped from the stopped bus, and that she was
thrown from the door of the bus by a lurching or jerking of said bus.
8. See HumanitarianDoctrine, by Mr. Becker.
9. 206 S. W. 2d 536 (Mo. 1947).
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preceding and at the time of the collision. Consequently the facts were insufficient to enable the jury to determine by a reasoning process that the defendants' truck was being negligently driven under the circumstances as
specifically alleged. To theorize that the defendants' truck was being negligently driven too far over to the defendant driver's left would be but speculation without a substantial basis of fact.
In the first of two separate cases with the same entitling, Holmes v.
McNeil,10 plaintiff's action for personal injuries received in an automobile
accident resulted in an adverse judgment when the trial court directed
verdicts for the defendant. In the second case, Holmes v. McNeill" the
husband of the plaintiff in the former action sought to recover damages for
the loss of the services of his wife and for expenses incurred for nursing and
medical attention arising out of the same accident. At the close of the
plaintiff's case the court directed a verdict for the defendants. From a
judgment sustaining the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the defendants
appealed. The evidence in both cases was that, when the automobile swerved
across the street and collided with an electric light pole, the driver was bent
over the steering wheel groping on the floor with his left hand and that his
right eye at least was open. The court held that this did not necessarily
establish the defendants' theory that the accident was due to the unexpected
loss of control of the driver's reflex action so as to justify a directed verdict
for the driver and the owner of the car who was riding in the rear seat; on
the contrary the jury could infer that he was consciously reaching for something on the floor with his left hand and giving his interest and attention
to some other matter than operating the automobile.
4. Lessor-lessee relationship
In Wkealenz v. St. Louis Soft Ball Ass'n., Inc.,12 the plaintiff, a member
of a soft ball team in the Municipal Soft Ball Association in St. Louis,
was injured while playing in a ball game in that city and while, in the regular course of the game, he was attempting to retrieve the ball -across the
-left field line into foul territory. He tripped on a piece of wire and fell on
some broken glass. The park where the game was played was owned by
the City of St. Louis and leased to the defendant under a reservation in
the lease permitting the Municipal Soft Ball Association to have the use of
10. 356 Mo. 846, 204 S. W. 2d 303 (1947).
11. 356 Mo. 763, 203 S. W. 2d 665 (1947).
12. 356 Mo. 622, 202 S. W. 2d 891 (1947).
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the park on the night in question for the play-off of the championship
series. Plaintiff's team was playing under she auspices of the Association
in that series. On the nights reserved for the games of the Association the
defendant had nothing to do with the park; the Association sold the tickets,
r&ained the proceeds, paid the park employees, the defendant having no
control or right of control and receiving no benefits whatever. The plaintiff
contended that by the lease it was the defendant's duty to keep the field
in a reasonably safe condition, even when the park had been taken over
and was being used by the Municipal Soft Ball Association as on the night
in question. The court held that the plaintiff did not have the status of an
invitee of the defendant and was not owed a duty as such, since the sole
right of control of the park at the time and in the playing of the game wherein the plaintiff was injured was, pursuant to the reservation in the lease from
the city to the defendant, not in the defendant. As owner the city reserved
to itself the use by itself and certain others at times so specifically reserved
and, pursuant *tosuch reservation of control and by separate arrangements
with the city, the Municipal Soft Ball Association had control and sole right
of control of the park at the time and in the playing of the game.
5. Municipal Corporations
McGaugk v. City of Fulton1 3 was an action for personal injuries resulting from an explosion when the plaintiff entered his basement with a lighted
cigarette in his mouth. His theory was that the explosion was of sewer or
natural gas or a combination of both sewer and natural gas. He charged
negligence on the part of the city in the construction, maintenance and
operation 6f its municipally owned gas and sewer systems so as to permit gas
to escape into the 'laintiff's basement. Negligence was alleged in the installation of its pipes, in failing to find and repair a break in the natural
gas main about 400 feet from the plaintiff's residence, and in the construction and maintenance of its sewer in the street with an unvented dead end
almost in front of the plaintiff's residence. There was evidence that h?les
in the'manhole covers for a distance of approximately 800 feet had bhen
covered with asphalt paving for some time. The natural gas line ran in the
parkway in front of plaintiff's residence but did not intersect the sewer
lines-the two lines parallelling one another for some distance up the street.
No one had previously detected an odor of gas in the basement, and once
or twice during the ten day period of plaintiff's occupancy prior to the
1
13. 35'6 Mo. 1122, 205 S. W. 2d 547 (1947).
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explosion the family washing had been done in the basement, using a coal oil
stove. The superintendent of the gas department testified that shortly after
the explosion he found a combustible gas in the uncapped cleanout pipe into
the sewer in the basement and there was a trace of 'sewer gas. Two city
employees testified that the uncapped cleanout pipe in the basement drain
would permit gas to enter the basement. Fifty-eight days after the explosion
a complete break in the gas main was found in the street approximately 500
feet from plaintiff's residence. There was no evidence that the house connected with the natural gas main. When the case was submitted to the jury
the plaintiff proffered instructions hypothesizing the city's negligence in connection with its sewer system but did not proffer an instruction hypothesizing negligence concerning natural gas. On the appeal, however, the plaintiff
claims his evidence demonstrated negligence on the part of the city in
connection with both its sewer and natural gas systems. The trial court
sustained ,the city's' motion for judgment in accordance with its previous
motion for a directed verdict, after a jury had been unable to agree upon a
verdict, on the specific grounds that the plaintiff's evidence against the city
failed to establish any causal connection between the alleged negligence of
the city and the explosion and injuries. On appeal the court held that there
was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which a jury could
reasonably find the city negligent as to its natural gas system or that any
negligent conduct respecting natural gas contributed to cause the explosion
and injuries complained of. There was no evidence of a break in the gas
line and the escape of gas prior to the explosion, as was found in -other
cases involving explosions of a similar nature, nor was there any showing
of the probable course of natural gas from this or any other broken main
discovered after the explosion to the sewer and to the plaintiff's basement.
The court found also that, "even assuming negligence in respect to the
unvented manhole covers and the proof of 'combustible gas,' there is no
evidence from which causal connection between the negligence and the
explosion could be found without resorting to mere conjecture and speculation." The trial court was held" not to have been in error in sustaining
the motion for a directed verdict, nevertheless the judgment was reversed
and the cause remanded "since it appears that the plaintiff may be able
upon another trial to adduce evidence, hypothetical or otherwise, demonstrating causal connection." Judge Ellison concurred in result, but believed
the plaintiff had made a prima facie case.
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In Baumgartne v. Kansas City, 4 a coalhole cover, imbedded in the sidewalk, tilted when the plaintiff stepped upon it and he fell astride the cover
with one leg in the coalhole, resulting in serious injuries. The city contended that there was no substantial evidence that the defect in the coalhole
cover, if there was a defect, existed for a sufficient length of time prior
to plaintiff's injuries to charge the city with notice, actual or constructive,
and, therefore, there was no evidence upon which to base the submission to
the jury in the instruction that the city knew of the defect in time to have
remedied it prior to the injuries. The plaintiff's theory was that the coalhole cover was "too small, ill fitting and loose" and that the city had
timely notice thereof. The evidence established that the coalhole cover had
been broken twenty four days-before the-accident, when a truck driver had
dropped a barrel of beer on the cover, and that the truck driver forthwith
had procured another lid for the coalhole. Defendant's witnesses testified
that they had received a complaint on that day of the cover being broken,
that a city employee had made an inspection and had reported that the
cover had been repaired by a private party. The evidence also established
that "dirt, -sidewalk sweepings, and stuff of that character" had accumulated
around the edge and the shoulder or flange of the rim of the coalhole to
such an extent that difficulty was experienced in replacing or fitting the cover
in the hole immediately' after plaintiff's injury. A yard clerk and foreman
in the Public Works Department of the city testified, from the hundreds
of coal or manholes he had seen and inspected, that if the cover had been
closely fitted, so that there was no play in it, the dirt and sidewalk sweepings could not get in and under the cover so as to make it work up, and that
in permitting dirt and sidewalk swveepings to accumulate under the cover it
was permitted-to tilt. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court
held this defect was discoverable upon an inspection of the surface, of the
sidewalk and was not latent under the evidence, .and that twenty-four days
notice to the city of the broken coalhole cover afforded i reasonable opportunity for correcting such a situation on a much used sidewalk.
6. Employer-employee relationship
In Porterv. Thompson,15 the action was for the alleged wrongful death
of plaintiff's husband who had been killed by a private watchman for the
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, for which the defendant was trustee.
14. 204
15.
206 S.
S. W.
W. 2d
2d 689
509 (Mo.
(Mo. 1947).
1947).
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The plaintiff had 'joined the watchman and the defendant. At the close
of the plaintiff's case the trial court had directed a verdict for the defendant and the jury returned a veidict against the watchman. The facts

showed that the watchman was stationed at the defendant's freight house
and the adjacent yards. During working hours he had gone to a restaurant
which was about three blocks from these yards. He had been a frequent
visitor there because of his infatuation for a woman who worked in the
restaurant. He shot the plaintiff's husband in the-back as he was seated
at the bar in the restaurant. The theory of the plaintiff's action against
the defendant was that the watchman was a man of vicious propensities,
violent temper, quarrelsome, and an unfit person to have such position as
a private watchman armed with a pistol. The evidence showed that, in his
frequent visits to the restaurant during hours while on duty for the defendant, he was always armed with a pistol carried in a scabbard; that he
was somewhat careless with the pistol, frequently placing it on the bar; that
he would walk about in the restaurant looking like he was mad; that he
had been a deputy sheriff in Arkansas and boasted of having killed two
persons in Arkansas; that three of four months prior to the shooting of

the plaintiff's husband and, while on duty and on the defendant's premises,
he had drawn a gun on a janitor of a car loading company and had threatened to blow out his brains. The last incident had been reported to the boss
of the person threatened, the latter guessing that the boss had reported
it to the defendant. The police had been notified of the watchman's conduct in the restaurant on previous occasions, but the defendant was not.
On one occasion the supervisory officer of the watchman was in the restaurant with the watchman, but on that occasion there was no out of order
conduct on the part of the watchman. It was also shown that he did not
have a private watchman's license from the police commissioners of St.
Louis to act as a private watchman, and to act without a license was in
violation of a city ordinance. However, it appeared that to secure a licenseas a private watchman the applicant had to be a resident of ,St. Louis
for three years. It does not appear in the decision how long it had been
since the watchman had come from Arkansas, but it is implied that it had
not been a sufficient period to qualify for a private watchman's license in
St. Louis. After the shooting the watchman was adjudged insane. The
court ruled that the evidence did not make a submissible case under the
rule of superior respondeat, as the watchman was not acting within the scope
of his employment at the time of the shooting in the restaurant, nor was
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a submissible case made out on the theory that the defendant was negligent
in employing a watchman of vicious propensities. The burden was on the
plaintiff to show that the defendant knew or should have known of the
watchman's vicious propensities to make the defendant liable on the theory
of negligence.
Graczak v. City of St. Louis" was an action by a blacksmith who was
employed by, the city for injuries resulting from his helper's failure to give
the proper signal of intention to operate a heavy steam hammer which struck
the blacksmith's hand. The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the trial court
and defendant appealed. Plaintiff's theory was that the defendant breached
its nondelegable duty to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to
work in that the helper, also an employee of the city, failed to heed and to
give the customary signals and warnings. The defendant's theory was
that the helper's negligence was merely incidental to the work itself, an
operative detail, and had 'no direct relation to the safety of the place of
work. The case was tried on the theory that they were fellow servants. In
reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, the court followed the well established doctrine that "where an appliance is reasonably safe to operate, and
its operation necessarily rests upon the care, intelligence, and fidelity of
the fellow servants of the person injured, the master will not be held responsible for an accident the nature of which indicates that it must have
been due to the manner in which the appliance was operated by one of
those workmen." Furthermore, that the raster's duty to provide a safe
place to work is not deemed to have been violated where the unsafety is
caused solely by the acts of coservants in failing to warn each other as to
the existence of dangerous conditions which have already supervened. In
the instant case the steam hammer was in proper condition and there was
no question as to the competency of the helper. The plaintiff's injury did
not result from any fault of plan, or construction, or defect, or lack of repair, or want of safety in the defendant's place of work or of the machinery
used therein, or in the manner ordinarily used; instead, the injury was
attributable to a danger incidental to the performance of the duties of I
competent fellow employee in an operative detail of the work in which they
were engaged at the time17
16. 356 Mo. 536, 202 S. W. 2d 775 (1947).
17. In Ackerman v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 558, 202 S. W. 2d 795 (1947), a railroad employee who had worked continuously for more than 10 years as a fireman,
engineer and brakeman until his discharge, was within the service letter statute so as
to require railroad to furnish a service letter, notwithstanding he was not called for
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7. Employer of independent contractor
One of the recognized exceptions to the general rule, that an employer
of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor, is where the work which the contractor is to do involves a risk of
bodily harm to others unless special precautions are taken. Another exception, somewhat overlapping, it where the contractor is to do work Which
is inherently dangerous to others if unskillfully or carelessly done, and involves a grave risk of bodily harm. In Stubblefield v. FederalReserve Bank
of St. Louis,' the owner of a building had employed an independent contractor to make alterations and additions to its building. The general contractor employed a subcontractor to remove and reset cornice stones, weighing from 300 to 500 pounds each, on the roof of the building 100 feet above
the city street. As the stones were moved the evidence showed that wooden
wedges used in the work would fall to the street below unless the workmen
held on to them. One of these wedges, 8%8 inches long and weighing about
three and one-half ounces, fell approximately 100 feet from near the top
of the defendant's building, striking the plaintiff on the head and shoulder.
The court held the owner of the building and the general contractor liable
for these injuries, caused by the subcontractor's alleged negligence in failing
to erect a barrier over the sidewalk, due to the inherent danger to the
passing public on the sidewalk, a danger that could reasonably be anticipated by defendants as being likely to result in injury, if proper precautions
were not taken. The giving of instructions which absolved them of liability
if the injuries were due solely to the negligence of the subcontractor was
reversible error.
work daily during the last two years, where he held himself available for work when
needed and did extra work when called. $5,000 actual damages and $4,000 punitive
damages held not excessive. There was substantial evidence of actual malice and
legal malice in refusing to give the service letter, thus authorizing an award of punitive damages and damages for mental suffering where the employee was unable to find
a position for a long period with another railroad because of such refusal. The court
said, "There can be no doubt but that mental pain and suffering is a proximate result
of a wrong which affects a man's economic security and prevents him from earning a
living for himself and family." In Oganaso v. Mellow, 356 Mo. 228, 201 S. W. 2d 356
(1947), on an appeal.by defendants from an order sustaining the plaintiff's motion
for a new trial, after verdict for defendant, the acts of a molder employed by foundry
company in negligently moving his automobile, which he did not use in his work, so
that an independent contractor repairing the foundry building was injured when the
ladder on which he was working was knocked over by the bumper of the automobile,
were held not to be within the scope of the molder's employment. Neither did the
fact that the foundry's maintenance man or molder's foreman told the molder to remove his automobile, so that it would not interfere with repair work of the plaintiff,
render the foundry company liable, the foreman or maintenance man having no
duties relating to the building or parking of automobiles and thus acting outside the
scope of their employment.
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B. Res ipsa loquitur
One of the questions, in Stubblefield v. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, was whether" the plaintiff was entitled to submit her cahse to the
jury upon the mere circumstance of the falling of a wooden wedge and under
the facts stated in the previous paragraph, when in her petition she pleaded
specific negligence and in addition proved it at the trial. The specific negligence alleged, and proved, was "that defendants failed to erect any barrier,
guard or covering over said sidewalk or failed to give notice" or warning
to persons using said sidewalk that there was danger in walking thereon
from falling building and repair materials." The court recognized that had
the plaintiff pleaded and relied upon the mere circumstance of the fall of
the wedge slje would have presented the typical res ipsa loquitur situation.
However, by pleading and proving, in addition to the fall of the wedge, the
failure to erect a barrier over the sidewalk and the failure to warn of the
attendant danger, the plaintiff was not entitled to submit her case on that
doctrine. The trial court's refusal of her instruction hypothesizing the defendant's liability upon a finding of the inferences permissible under the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine was upheld.
One of the grounds of appeal, in Maxie v. Gulf, M. & 0. R. R., 20 was
the submission of the case to the jury under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur
when the petition pleaded and charged the defendant with specific acts of
negligence. The plaintiff was injured when, in his work as an employee of
the defendant in repairing freight cars in the defendant's yard, four boxcar
doors; which were standing behind him and propped' against a post, fell
upon him. The plaintiff's petition charged the defendant with negligent
failure to warn, negligent failure safely to secure the doors, and negligent
failure to place the doors in the usual rack. The court held that the attending facts and circumstances showed an occurrence which in the ordinary
coursd of things does not happen if the one in the exclusive possession and
control exercises proper care, and were sufficient to make a case for the
jury under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur had the plaintiff pleaded general
negligence, but he was foreclosed from submitting his cause under that
doctrine by.the specific allegations of his petition. However, since plaintiff
made a case for the jury under the doctrine, the court remanded the cause
18. 356 Mo. 1018, 204 S.W. 2d 718 (1947).
19. 356 Mo. 1018, 204 S. W. 2d 718 (1947).
20. 356 Mo. 633, 202 S. W. 2d 904 (1947).
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so that the plaintiff may amend his petition, pleading general negligence
21
only, if advised to do so.
C. Defenses in negligence cases
In an action for injuries sustained in a fall down an open elevator shaft
from the lobby floor level to the bottom of the shaft, judgment, in O'Dell v.
Dean,22 was for the defendant. The cause was submitted on alleged negligence in failing to keep the first floor lobby and elevator reasonably lighted,
in failing to provide any guards, locks, railings or other device in and about
the elevator shaft and door, and in failing to warn plaintiff of the danger.
On appeal, plaintiff assigned error on the admission of evidence and the
giving of instructions by the defendant, but the defendant contended that
the errors, if any, were wholly immaterial because plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law, and if no case was made fox .the jury the errors
complained of were immaterial. In reviewing the evidence favorable to the
plaintiff, the court ruled that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, on a showing that he stood before a known open
door of a known elevator shaft, looked into the dark shaft where he could
not and did not see anything, and then stepped into the shaft without
knowing that the elevator was there. The elevator was in an office and
business building owned and operated by the defendant. Parts of the building were rented to different tenants, the defendant retaining possession and
control of the first floor lobby which was used by the various tenants and
their employees. The defendant further exercised control of the elevator
and furnished each tenant with a key to the building. The employer of
the plaintiff was one of the tenants and had furnished the plaintiff with a
duplicate key, the defendant making no objection to tenants furnishing
employees with duplicate keys. The elevator was regularly operated by
defendant's employees from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. The operator of the elevator
and janitor left the building at 6 p.m. and locked the outside door to the
lobby. The elevator cage was left at street level, the lightsin the cage were
turned off and the door into the shaft was closed. The defendant knew
it was quite customary for-those carrying keys to go into the building in
the evening and holidays and to operate the elevator. The plaintiff also
knew that anyone with a key to the building used the elevator at will. The
elevator cage could be operated when the lobby door was open and the door
21. This case is noted in 13 Mo. L. REv. 110 (1948).
22. 356 Mo. 861, 204 S. W. 2d 248 (1947).
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could be opened whether or not the elevator cage was at the floor level.
The plaintiff had operated the elevator on several occasions, knew the door
was apparently worn and that if one slammed the elevator door too lhard'
it would bounce back open, probably halfway or sometimes three-fourths of
the way open. A small light located within the elevator cage could be turned
on or off from within the cage. The plaintiff knew where the switch was
located and had turned it on and off. There never had been any light in
the elevator shaft. Probably from a street light outside, the plaintiff testified that there was enough light in the front, part of the lobby that he could
see the outline of the elevator door: He admitted that there was so little
light in the elevator shaft that he could not see a thing. The court distinguished this case from cases where the elevator approach was dimly
lighted, or where there was substantial evidence which would have led an
ordinarily prudent person to suppose the elevator cage was present, or where
there were any facts to justify such a person in thinking the cage was
present when it was not. No custom or practice justifying reliance on the
presence of the elevator was shown. The plaintiff did testify that he had
never before found the elevator door open when the elevator was not there,
but he did not assign this as a reason for being satisfied or thinking that
the elevator was there on this occasion.
One of the grounds for appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, in
Rkineberger v. Thompson4, 23 was the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
as, a matter of law in not exercising the highest degree of care for his own
safety while driving his automobile over the crossing of the defendant (trustee
and receiver for the Missouri Pacific R. R.) where, in the collision between
defendant's train and the plaintiff's automobile, the plaintiff sustained
serious injuries. The evidence showed that the defendant's right-of-way
to the northward of the crossing curved to the westward and passes the
crossing in a continuation of the curve, the east rail being higher than the west
,one and making the crossing somewhat uneven. The defendant's trains,
coming southwardly, pass through a deep cut the banks of which gradually
lessen in height until the earth flattens out at the crossing. There was evidence tending to show that the cut absorbs sound waves and that a train
coming from the north could not be heard until it was practically on the
crossing. At a point 222 feet east of the east rail at the crossing on a clear
day, the sight distance up the track to the right (north) was 537 feet. At
23. 356 Mo. 520, 202 S. W. 2d 6 (1947).
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the time of the collision plaintiff testified it was "deep dusk" and at this
point he could see but ,150 to 200 feet up the track to the northward. The
plaintiff was quite familiar with the crossing, having driven over it 800 to
1000 times. The defendant had constructed an automatic signaling device,
having a combination of "wig-wag," red light and bell 'signals, to warn
travelers of the approach of trains. At 7:15 p.m. on the day of the accident,
plaintiff testified that he had stopped 22V2 feet east of the east rail at the
crossing and looked both to the north and to the south but did not see
anything coming, that he looked at the automatic signaling device but it was
not working in any respect, that he started up his car to go across and
just as he got his car in low gear and had moved a very few feet he heard
a train whistle; that he then looked up the track and saw the train coming
100 feet up the track; that he thought the only thing to do was to back up,
but before he could place the car in reverse and let out the clutch the train
struck the front fender of his car; that before the whistle was sounded, the
plaintiff had heard nothing like a noise of an approaching train; and that he
saw no headlight on the locomotive. The court held that on this evidence
the trial court did not err in submitting the issues of the plaintiff's negligence
to the jury. The circumstance of the silent, unlit and motionless signaling
device impliedly assured the highway traveler that the crossing could be
made in safety. The court pointed out that, "While one in the exercise of
due care would not rely solely upon the performance of defendant of the
duty assumed in erecting the signaling device and would use his own senses,
yet, a person, although exercising due care, doubtless would feel more
secure and would be less vigilant that if defendant's implied assurance that
the crossing could be made in safety had not existed."
In the case of Atherton v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 24 the facts
of which are set forth under Gas and Electricity, infra, the jury could find
that the deceased had taken all precautions within the defendant's warning,
and that the dangers attending the high voltage passing over the lightning
arrester circuit was not known or obvious to him. Since he was on his
employer's property for its proper maintenance and, having followed instructions, if he believed the substation was fully de-energized the court did
not think it could as a matter of law hold the deceased contributorily negli5
gent to relieve the defendant of its negligence.2
24. 356 Mo. 505, 204 S. W. 2d 59 (1947).
25. Whether contributory negligence is available as a defense to an action- based
upon the Federal Safey Appliance Act, where the person killed was not an employee of the defendant carrier, see Floyd v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 250, 201 S. W. 2d
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In Durmeier v. St. Louis County Bis Co.,28 the action was for personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff bus passenger in a collision of the bus
with an automobile going in the same direction, when the bus came to a
sudden abrupt stop, throwing him against an object and injuring his back.
The plaintiff submitted his case to the jury by an instruction on the res ipsa
loqulitur doctrine authorizing the jury to infer negligence from these circumstances. The trial court gave the following sole cause instruction: "You
are instructed that if you find and believe from the evidence that the
operator of the motorbus was not guilty of any negligence in the operation
of said bus, as such negligence is defined and set out in other instructions;
and if you further find and believe that the driver of the automobile mentioned in the evidence suddenly and without warning swerved or turned
said automobile into and against or immediately in front of said motorbus
at a time when the operator of the bus could not in the exercise of the highest
degree of care have avoided a collision; and if you further find that in
swerving or turning said automobile in the manner set out herein, the driver
of said automobile was guilty of negligence, and that such negligence, if any,
was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the collis'ion and injuries and
damages (if any) to plaintiff, then your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant." The plaintiff contended that the instruction excluded from the
jury's consideration negligence on the part of the bus driver, such as keeping
a lookout, failing to stop, excessive speed and failure to sound a warning,
because such facts were not negatived. The court pointed out the unreasonableness of requiring a defendant to negative in its instruction all of the
charges of negligence (six in number) relied upon by the plaintiff in his
argument, whereas in submitting his case on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
plaintiff himself specified no acts of negligence.
On appeal, in Hampton v. Wabash R. R.,2 7 the main facts of which
establishing defendant's negligence are set forth under Railroads, infra, the
defendant Eontended that it was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground
the casualty was a result of the deceased's primary and sole negligence in
violating an order requiring him not to. operate the compressor unless he

390 (1947), discussed infra under the title, Railroads. Flint v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R., 207 S. W. 2d 474 (Mo. 1947), involved the question of whether a 13 year old
boy was contributorily negligent as a matter of law when struck by train while riding
in a truck with a man who was employed to operate the truck and who was making
the trip for the special purpose connected with his work.
26. 203 S. W. 2d 445 (Mo. 1947).
27. 356 Mo. 999, 204 S.,W. 2d 708 (1947).
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had a watchman on the bank. The evidence failed to showy that there was a
lookout man on the bank at the time of the accident. The court held that
the violation of a rule or order of the employer in this case merely concurred with the negligence of the engineer of the fast passenger train in
not sounding a warning whistle and was not the sole proximate cause of the
accident so as to bar recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The mere placing of the watchman on the bank would not have insured the
safety of the men at work on the track, as he must first discover the approaching train in time to warn the men, then transmit the warning in time for
them to reach a place of safety. The giving of this instruction to the deceased did not thereby relieve the defendant of its duty to warn by whistle
as prescribed by its rules and by custom and practice, a duty which it owed
, vhether a watchman was stationed on top of the bank or not. Contributory
'negligence under the Act enters only into the consideration in mitigation
of damages.28
28. For the cases involving the defense of sole cause which were predicated on
the humanitarian doctrine, see HumanitarianDoctrine, p.
by Mr. Becker. Other
cases in which the sole cause issue was not of sufficient importance to be set forth
more fully. Bolino v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 355 Mo. 1236, 200 S. W. 2d 352 (1947)
was an action by an administrator (the father) for benefit of father and mother
under the Federal Employers'.Liability Act for the death of an employee of the defendant when a pushcar, being towed by a motor car, became derailed. The defendants appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff was based on the trial court's refusal
to give a sole cause instruction to the effect that the derailment of the pushcar was
caused by the negligent loading of the pushcar by the deceased as to permit equipment to roll off the front end of the pushcar and onto the rail. The court ruled that
the evidence was not sufficient to support a sole cause instruction. In Melber v.
Yourtee, 203 S. W. 2d 727 (Mo. 1947), the plaintiff was allegedly injured while riding
in an automobile with her husband, when it was struck by an automobile driven by
the defendant as the latter was making a left turn into a street intersection. The
theories of the defense were contributory negligence of the plaintiff, in permitting
without protest the car in which she was riding as a passenger to be driven on the
street at a place not as close to the right hand side thereof as was practicable, and
sole negligence on the part of the plaintiff's husband. The trial court after advising
the jury that it was the duty of one driving an automobile on the public highway
to drive as close to the right hand side as is practicable, gave the following instrucdion:

"if you find and believe that the plaintiff's husband was
driving and operating
a motor vehicle on Grand Avenue at or near intersection with Magnolia avenue
and that plaintiff was a passenger in. said automobile and on the 7th day of
October, 1945, the said automobile- was involved in a collision with the defendant's automobile and if you further find and believe from the evidence that at
the time of said collision the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was being
operated at a place on said Grand Avenue that was not as close to the right
hand side of said Grand Avenue was not practicable and while the negligence
of plaintiff's husband is not attributable to plaintiff, yet if you further find and
believe from the evidence that plaintiff saiv and observed that said automobile
was not being driven as close to right hand side of Grand Avenue as was practicable, if so, and if you further find and believe from the evidence that the
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D. Burden of Proof
In these annual surveys the writer has repeatedly called attention
to the efforts of the court to provide a standardized instruction on the
burden of proof in the negligence cases. 29 In spite of steady condemnation
of a burden of proof instruction which requires the plaintiff to sustain his
case to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, or which directs the jury to
find for the defendant if the evidence touching the charge of negligence
against the defendant does not preponderate in favor of the plaintiff, or is
evenly balanced, lawyers and trial judges continue to use these phrases.
(italics the court's.) In Leaman v. Campbell 66 Express Truck Lines, Inc.,ts
the court again cautions against the use of these phrases on the ground
that an attempt to state too many technical rules, or to go into degrees
of preponderance of the evidence is almost certain to get the matter so complicated that a jury of laymen will have no idea as to what is meant.
In Quigley v. St. Louis Public Service Qo.,81 plaintiff on appeal complained of an instruction which told the jury "that the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to prove by a greater weight or the preponderance of the
evidence" that defendant was negligent on the ground that the word "credible" was omitted before the word "evidence." The court ruled that this
omission placed no additional burden on the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's
complaint being of nondirection, not misdirection, she should have requested
a clarifying instruction if desired. The court had informed the jury that
they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of their testimony, hence they would understand.32
II. MALICIOUS PROsEuTION
Malicious prosecution was alleged by the plaintiffs, in Ripley v. Bank
of Skidmore,33 where a persistent effort on the part of the defendant had
driving of said automobile at a place on said Grand Avenue that was not as
close to the right hand side thereof as was practicable, if so, and the acquiescence
therein by plaintiff was the sole cause of the collision in question, then the
court instructs you that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover and your verdict
should be for the defendant."
In reversing a judgment for the defendant, the court held that there was no
development of the facts sufficient to base a sole cause claim on the negligence of
the plaintiff's husband, or on the part of the plaintiff in failing to protest the place
her husband was driving at the time of the accident. The negligence of the husband
was not submitted and the negligence of the plaintiff was not actually submitted
but assumed only.
29. See annual surAeys in the MISSOURI LAW REVIEW beginning in 1937.
30. 355 Mo. 939, 199 S. W. 2d 359 (1947).
31. 201 S. W. 2d 169 (Mo. 1947).
32. Also see Gildehaus v Jones, 356 Mo. 8, 200 S. W 2d 523 (1947).
33. 355 Mo. 897, 198 S. W. 2d 861 (1947).
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been made to collect an alleged claim on a note by means of a series of proceedings ultimately directed against plaintiffs' 80-acre farm. The plaintiffs
charged the defendants with a design or scheme to use these proceedings
maliciously and without probable cause for the purpose of extorting money
or land from the plaintiffs. The series of suits was commenced with the
bank's filing a suit on a note against John A. Ripley. Ripley had signed
the note without receiving any consideration. Summons was attempted to
be served while he was in his last illness and insane, and the bank took a
default judgment which was void. Shortly thereafter, Ripley died, leaving
Alice Ripley, his widow, and other plaintiffs as his heirs who inherited
the 80-acre farm. Some time after Ripley's death, the bank filed a claim
against his estate on the void default judgment, and later obtained an order
for the sale of the farm to satisfy the claim. The plaintiffs by a writ of
error coram nobis succeeded in having the default judgment set aside, the
court of appeals holding it was void ab initio. The bank instituted a mandamus suit which was decided against the bank. Then the bank filed suit
against the administrator de bonis non of the estate, seeking to recover on
the note and default judgment, and lost. The bank continued to press its
claim, through the order of sale it had obtained in the probate court, and
had the farm sold. It was purchased by an officer and agent of the bank.
The officer then brought a quiet title suit against the plaintiffs. He lost his
case on appeal and his deed to the farm from the administrator was canceled. He then sought to recover from the administrator the money he
had paid for the farm and an order to sell it to satisfy the lien. Ultimately
he lost this suit. The plaintiffs were subjected to continuous litigation for
eleven years. In this action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff's petition
had been dismissed for failure to state a claim and plaintiffs appealed. The
defendants contended that the judgment obtained in the first proceeding by
the bank against Ripley, even though a default judgment, was conclusive
evidence that the various proceedings were initiated with probable cause
to believe they were legally just and proper. In reversing the judgment and
remanding the cause with directions to reinstate the petition, the court
distinguished between a judgment or finding in favor of the plaintiff in
the original action, which is conclusive evidence of probable cause, and
the one here on two grounds: the judgment in issue was an ex parte judgment since it was obtained by default; and the default judgment was not
merely erroneous or irregular but was void ab initio. Therefore, the order of
the probate court allowing against Ripley's estate the demand based on the
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void judgment and the order of sale of the farm were likewise void and no
evidence of probable cause. The court also held that "although the original
action was against John A. Ripley, the tort complained of in this case is
the malicious prosecution of plaintiffs which commenced after his death,
and which is based on proceedings ancillary to the void judgment against
him to collect the void judgment from plaintiffs or their property. After
Ripley's death the original suit was, for the purposes of this action, against
plaintiffs herein, represented by the widow as administratrix, who, in effect,
became the adversary parties to the bank. '3 4 The proceedings against the
administratrix and against the administrator were also held, for the purposes
of this action, equivalent to proceedings against the plaintiffs.3"
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W.

SIMPKINS*

The Supreme Court of Missouri during the year 1947 was called upon

to decide a number of novel questions, some of considerably general interest.
PROBATE ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

Perhaps the case of greatest general interest to lawyers is the decision
in the matter of Sternberi'sEstate discussing the circumstances under which
services involving business considerations, when performed by an attorney,
are compensable as legal services to be paid for as such by the estate and not
to be paid by the executor out of its fee. The case lays down a largely pragmatic test as to when lawyers should participate in business negotiations on
behalf of executors, to-wit, the test of whether the other parties to the negotiations were also represented by lawyers. The case further holds that, even
though an executor is a lawyer or, as in this instance, employs lawyers on a
salary basis, he or it may nevertheless employ outside counsel whose compensation will be allowed as legal fees.
34. The statute of limitations had run on some of the proceedings terminated
more than five years before the filing of the present action for malicious prosecution.
The court in remanding the cause with directions to reinstate the petition doubted
whether the plaintiffs in this 'action would be permitted to recover actual damages
for the expenses incurred in the proceedings which had finally terminated more than
five years before the filing of this case. However, the allegations in those cases were
necessary in stating a case to recover for successive proceedings, and were -releyant on
the issue of malice and, therefore, to the right to recover for punitive damages.
35. In Nash v. Normandy State Bank, 201 S. W. 2d 299 (Mo. 1947), there
was a good analysis of the necessary elements of an action based on deceit, but the
plaintiff facts did not make out a case.
* Attorney, St. Louis. A.B., Harvard, 1930; J.D., Washington University,1933.
1. 204 S.W. 2d 761 (Mo. 1947).
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The question of what assets should bear the burden of federal estate
taxes was before the supreme court in the case of In Re Poe's Estate2 where
it was held that the executor should pay federal estate taxes out of the personal estate and could not collect them out of the real estate although the
court expressly refused to rule whether, if the personal legatees had brought
a separate suit in equity they could have compelled the devisees of the real
estate to make contribution. The court further held that with reference to
ordinary real property taxes they should be paid out of the personal estate,
assuming there was sufficient personal estate. In the slightly later case of
Priedeuin, v. Jamison3 the essential issue was whether or not the burden of
federal estate taxes should be apportioned as between testator's iesiduary
estate and- the beneficiaries of insurance on his life. Section 826 (c) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that the beneficiaries of policies of insurance
must contribute pro rata to the amount of such taxes

"...unless

decedent

directs otherwise in will." The court held that the following clause did not
constitute such a direction:
"I direct that all inheritance, succession and estate~taxes, both
federal and state, which may be assessed against my estate, or against
any legatee or devisee in this my Will named, shall be paid by my
Executors, so that each legatee or devisee shall receive his or her
legacy or devise in full, clear and free of all taxes herein described."
The decision is placed upon the ground that the beneficiary of an insurance policy is not, within the language of said clause, either a legatee or devisee and does not receive part of the testator's probate estate and hence is
not entitled to the benefits conferred by said clause.
The-issue as to the finality of orders of the probate court was before the
supreme court in the cases of Brune v. RatkbunA and Boatmen's Nat. Bank
of St. Louis v. Bolles.5 In the first case it was held that although an order
of the probate court selling land which is in fact homestead property, without
the required appraisal, is wholly void, there need not be such an appraisal
where the land is not homestead, and where, on sale of non-homestead land,
the widow's dower is not set apart to her the only effect is to render the sale
subject to the widow's dower right, but otherwise the sale is valid. In the
latter case it was held that a settlement to revocation of the administratrices
who had been replaced by an executor when the will of Hugh W. Thomasson
2. 201 S.W. 2d 441 (Mo. 1947).
3. 202 S.W. 2d 900 (Mo. 1947).
4. 204 S.W. 2d 705 (Mo. 1947).
5. 202 S.W. 2d 53 (Mo. 1947).
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was subsequently found was res judicata so as to prevent attack on settlement of claims of the alleged wid'v, which settlement had been approved by
an order of the probate court before the payments were made and were again
approved in the settlement to revocation. The case further holds that Section
233 of the Missouri Revised Statutes gives to the probate court broad power
to approve compromises of claims of any character of a person who is alleged
to owe money to the estate, to hold property of the estate, or to have a claim
against the estate for money or property.
Although not strictly within the scope of this discussion, the case of
Sontag v. Stix6 is of interest in connection with the finality of orders of a probate court. In that case, brokers had, pursuant to an order of the probate"
court, sold to the curator of the estate of an insane person notes which the
brokers did not know were an illegal investment under the statute. It was
held that the brokers were, in fact, protected by such order and were not
liable to the estate even though, in fact, such order was improperly made,
since, as a matter of law 7 Section 418 of the Missouri Revised Statutes authorizes a curator only to "loan" funds of his ward on the basis of real estate

security and does not authorize the purchase of existing real estate mortgage
notes.
In Barnes v. Boatme's Nat. Bank of St. Louis' it was held that claims
of an alienist for services to administratrices may be established by suit in the
circuit court and that probate court does not have exclusive jurisdiction
thereof, thereby deciding a matter which had been one of doubt and difficulty
in Missouri for a number of years.
9
it was held that the one year statute of non-claim
In Hamilton v. Linm
does not bar a suit in the circuit court by which plaintiffs seek to have title
to real estate vested in them by virtue of alleged payments made to a deceased under a contract for a deed.

WILL CONTESTS AND OTHER ATrACKS ON VALIDITY OF WILLS

State ex rel. Mutt&v. Buzard ° was a proceeding by writ of prohibition to
prevent the setting aside by the trial court of a judgment previously rendered
by the trial court holding the will invalid, in which judgment it had been
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

199 S.W. 2d 371 (Mo. 1947).
See Re Keisker's Estate, 350 Mo. 727, 168 S.W. 2d 96 (1943).
199 S.W. 2d 917 (Mo. 1947), noted 13 Mo. L. REV. 89 (1948).
200 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. 1947).
205 S.W. 2d 538 (Mo. 1947).
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found that the widow was the sole heir. It had subsequently developed that
there were surviving brothers and sisters who would be entitled to the estate
if the will was invalid (subject to the widow's statutory rights of election).
The supreme court held that the trial court could not set aside its judgment
on the basis of a writ of error coram nobis because the alleged error of fact
contradicted the records of the trial court, the verity of which cannot be impugned on a writ of error coram nobis, the issue of heirship having been raised
in the pleadings of certain of the defendants in the will contest.
In the case of Odom v. Langston1' the supreme court had previously
held that the five year statute of limitations bars a suit by an heir or distributee to have the residuary clause in a will declared invalid on the ground
that it violated the rule against perpetuities. This was qualified in the case
of St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Kelly,' 2 which construed the complicated provisions of the will there involved as .violating the rule against perpetuities, and then held that this point might be raised by the trustee under
the purported will in a suit for instructions. With reference to the prior decision in Odom v. Langston, the court said:
"We think the decision is not in point. It-concedes that an executor or trustee under a will may bring a suit for the construction
of the will without being subject to statutory limitations. The appellant trustee is trustee of the testatrix's will in this case, and it
is a suit for the construction of the will. The trustee itself raises the
perpetuities issue as a live question. Neither is it shown that the
trustee has been in adverse possession of the trust property, but only
as trustee, for better or worse, whatever the will means and whatever
may be its legal effect. We think
there is no merit in this point."
I
The limitation upon the doctrine of presumption of undue influence due
to confidential relationship was again pointed out in Buckner v. Tuggle 3
where it was held that there was no such presumption unless there was a
showing that the ". . .fiduciary beneficiary was active in some way which
caused or assisted in causing execution of the will." Likewise, in State ex rel.
Smith v. Hughes'4 it was held that contestants did not make a submissible
case of undue influence merely by showing that the beneficiary had dominated
the testator's personal conduct and home life, when there was no evidence that

11.
12.
13.
14.

195 S.W. 2d 463 (Mo. 1946).
199 S.W. 2d 344 (Mo. 1947).
203 S.W. 2d'449 (Mo. 1947).
200 S.W. 2d 360 (Mo. 1947).
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the beneficiary had suggested the making of the will or even knew about it at
the time.
In Crampton v. Osbornl5 the issue involved was whether or not a will
found in a partially mutilated condition had been revoked after the divorce
of testator from his former wife, the sole beneficiary in said will. Following
Sawyer v. French16 and rejecting Childers v. Pickenpaugh17 the court held
that hearsay testimony of two witnesses who had heard the testator say that
he had torn up his will with intent to revoke it was to be considered where it
had been introduced without objection and was to be given "its natural
probative effect." The court clarified the Missouri law, following the weight
of authority outside of Missouri, and held that the declaration of the testator that he did not want his ex-wife to have any of his property and that he
had revoked the will was admissible of his intent, although not admissible
of the facts themselves. Likewise, and for the same limited purpose, it upheld
the admission of the petition in the divorce case in which the testator had
charged his ex-wife of being guilty of adultery.
Stewart v. Shelton'8 holds that where a husband and wife had made a
joint will pursuant to an oral contract between them, such will was irrevocable after the death of the husband.
DEFEATING A WIDOW'S MARITAL RIGHTS

In the cases of Wanstrath v. Kappel 9 and Wahl v. WatdA0 the court
again had before it the validity of gifts made by a husband during his lifetime which after his death were claimed by his widow to have been made in
contemplation of death and with an intent to defraud her of her marital
rights. In the first case the court found from the evidence that such a contemplation of imminent death existed, while in the second, likewise upon the
evidence, the court found that- there was no immediate contemplation of
death. The cases represent the further clarification of the rule of law first
clearly laid down in Missouri in the case of Merz-v. Tower Grove Bank and

Trust Company.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

21

201 S.W. 2d 336 (Mo. 1947).
290,Mo. 374, 1.c. 3$5, 235 S.W. 126, 1.c. 130 (Mo. 1921).
219 Mo. 376, l.c. 436, 118 S.W. 453 (Mo. 1909).
201 S.W. 2d 395 (Mo. 1947).
201 S.W. 2d 327 (Mo. 1947).
206 S.W. 2d 334 (Mo. 1947).
344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W. 2d 611 (Mo. 1939).
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CASES INVOLVING TRUSTEES

Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Company v. Morse12 answers
questions which have long been unsettled in Missouri and holds that a trustee, in the absence of contrary directions in the instrument, is bound to amortize any premiums over par which the trustee may pay for bonds purchased
by it, but is neither obligated nor permitted to accumulate discounts under
par which it might pay for such bonds and distribute such discounts to the
life tenant when such bonds purchased under par are redeemed. Where a
bond is purchased for more than its call price, where the bond is not callable
until some future year, then such premium over the call price should be amortized to the first call date rather than all being charged off in the year of purchase. The court thereby adopts in toto the Massachusetts rule, although
pointing out that a number of states reject such requirement of amortization,
and that such requirement is not in accordance with the Uniform Principal
and Income Act adopted by twelve states. The court further held that a provision in a will that the trustee might determine what was principal and what
was income as "may seem just and equitable" did not authorize the
trustee to act contrary to the rules of law as they are now being laid down
by the court, thus illustrating again the illusory nature of attempting to give
discretion to trustees in matters which the court determines are questions
of law.
Lane v. St. Louis Union Trust Company23 involved the conflicting claims
of the children of the first marriage of the deceased and of her second husband to a trust which had been executed in 1908. The trust provided that
upon her death the trustee should pay over the trust estate to her second husband upon receipt from him of a valid waiver of his rights to her estate, otherwise it should be paid to her executors. The court finds as a fact that the second husband had prior to his wife's death abandoned her. The court holds
that the trust was a continuing offer which could only become a contract if
the husband was still entitled to marital rights at the time of his wife's death.
The court further holds that he had forfeited such rights by abandoning her
without just cause, applying Section 337 even though it did not provide for
such forfeiture when the trust was executed in 1908.
4
. Mercantile-Commerce'Bankand Trust Company v. Morse"
was an action to construe the will of Paul Biown. His will as to the share of one of his
granddaughters (now Dorothy Brown Morse) directed as follows:
22. 201 S.W. 2d 915 (Mo. 1947).
23. 201 S.W. 2d 288 (Mo. 1947).
24. 201 S.W. 2d 317 (Mo. 1947).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1948

87

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1948], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

"(14) As and when my said granddaughter attains the age of
thirty (30) years, I direct my Trustee to pay over, deliver and convey unto her one-eighth (1/8) of her.portion of the trust estate then
in its hands, free of trust.
"(15) As and when my said granddaughter attains the age of
thirty-five (35) years, I direct my Trustee to pay over, deliver and
convey unto her one-eighth (1/8) of her portion of the trust estate
then in its hands, free of trust."
The court held that at age 35 the granddaughter was entitled to receive
only one-eighth of the then amount in the hands of the trustee and not oneeighth of the original amount of the trust estate as it had existed prior to the
distribution of the first one-eight at age 30. The court rejects the ruling in
the somewhat similar case of Industrial Trust Company v. Hall'2 where the
will had contained a complete division of the trust estate in one paragraph
and had referred to the second one-quarter as "another one-fourth" and the
final amount as the "other half."
Ervin v. Davis26 involved the powers of trustees in a deed by which a
house was conveyed to named individuals in trust ". . .that said premises
shall be held, kept and maintained and disposed of as a place of residence for
the use and occupancy of the Preachers of the Methodist Episcopal
Church, South, who may from time to time be appointed in said town."
The named individuals were, in fact, trustees of the local Methodist Church,
South, which was unincorporated and hence was required to hold title to any
property in the name of trustees. The court holds that the members of the
church (rather than the minister from time to time) were the beneficiaries
of the trust and that the powers of the trustees would be governed by the
Rules of Church Discipline, even though the normal clause (required by said
Rules) providing to this effect was not incorporated in this particular deed.
MISCELLANEOUS

The practical problem in suits involving wills and trusts of determining
the jurisdiction of the supreme court and the absolute necessity of there being a definite and positive affirmative showing that more than $7500.00 is in
controversy was emphasized in three cases. 27 In Adams v. Moberg8 the
court found upon the facts that a contract to devise real estate should be spe-

cifically enforced.
25. 66 R.Is. 201, 18 Ad. 2d 629 (1941).
26. 199 S.W. 2d 366 (Mo. 1947).
27. First National Bank of Kansas City v. Schaake, 200 S.W. 2d 326 (Mo.
1947); Hanna v. Sheetz, 200 S.W. 2d 338 (Mo. 1947); McGuire v. Hutchinson, 201
S.W. 2d 322 (Mo. 1947).
28. 205 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. 1947).
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